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Arthur Schopenhauer takes Kant's Critique of Pure
~, particularly its transcendental idealism and the
distinction between phenomena and things-in-themselves, as
the point of departure for his own philosophy. However,
Schopenhauer rejects Kant's method of deducing the thing-
in-itself and he places his own idealism on an empirical
foundation. Ethics also, according to schopenhauer, is
properly justified only from the existential standpoint of
human sUbjectivity always "rooted" in the world. The
upshot of Schopenhauer's philosophy is a dark, and
profoundly pessimistic, picture of the human condition
wherein redemptive possibilities must rely solely on human
consciousness, on the denial of the manifest world, and on
self-abnegation or complete suspension of the will-to-live
through that freedom Which consciousness i§..
schopenhauer's influence on writers and thinkers of
the nineteenth century is well-documented in the literature
and his philosophy of pessimism is there assigned an
important role in the artistic development of Thomas Hardy.
Yet, while key Schopenhauerian themes recur throughout
Hardy's ~, Schopenhauer's impact on Hardy is less
decisive than is sometimes held to be the case. Indeed, a
Schopenhauerian reading of Hardy's later works clearly
ii
shows that the artist's mature thought is quite distinctly
un-Schopenhauerian.
Chapter one addresses schopenhauer's epistemology and
meUlphysics along with their background in Kantian
philosophy and Schopenhauer's criticisll of the latter.
Chapter two is a discussion of Schopenhauer's o,thics of
compassion and his doctrine of asceticism. Chapters three
and tour then consider Hardy's art in relation to
Schopenhauerian philosophy, especially with regilrd to
schopenhauer's theory of perception, metaphysics of nilture
and of character, his theory of freedom and his doctrine of
self-abnegation. Chapter five summarizes those views which
emerge from the foregoing discussion concerning tho,
relation of schopenhauer's philosophy to Hardy's i1rt.
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IHTRODUC'l'IOH
While Schopenhilluer is the ackno....ledged intellectual
parent of a whole lineaqe of major thinkers, lncludinq
Nietzsche, Freud, Heidegger and Wittgenstein, his relation
to artists like Tur<jenev, Zola, Maupassant, Tolstoy,
Proust, Conrad, Wagner, Shaw, and Mann is also well
documented (Magee, 262-85,326-90). Most significant for
the 11 terary output of Thomas Hardy, however, is that
Sch0i.,cnhauer's philosophy appeared to offer an at least
sUbjective escape from an existence perceived to be
Ultimately irrational through a pessimistic view of the
world, a morality of sympathy and the cultivation of
aesthetic detachment. It is precisely these elements in
Schopenhauer's philosophy Which confirmed and reinforced
Hardy's own essentially pessimistic views giving these a
philosophical foundation. The question to be addressed
here is twofold: to what. extent is Hardy's artistic output
influenced by Schopenhauer's philosophy? and to what extent
is Hardy's art illustrative of the epistemological,
ontological, aesthetic, and ethical ideas of this
philosopher?
On the nature and origin of Hardy's pessimism, Mary
Ann Gauthier l<elly says in her doctoral thesis:
Hardy's pessimism originated in his own
temperament and was, no doubt reinforced by his
observations of the world ilIround him, which
included the general atmosphere left in the wake
of the reVolutions on the continent and the
poverty and degradation reSUlting from the
industrial ReVolution. (Hardy's Reading,
1980,p. iv)
In addition to thus stating that Hardy's pessimism ia first
and for~most a state of mind supported by personal and
historical factors, Kelly also says that Schopenhauer's
philosophy is the most apparent source of Hardy's later,
more distilled views. Kelly argues that Hardy's novo.!.,
Tess of the p'Urberyilles, clearly illustrates
schopenhauerian ideas of the nature of perception, the
determinism of eXistence, the pervasiveness of the blind,
indifferent, ever-striving will, and the transitory nature
of happiness in a purposeless universe (p. vi-viii).
schopenhauer'8 adaptation of the Kantian epistemology
uses the German term yorstellunq ("representation") to
characterize his own theory that the world of phenomena is
an appearance (or illusion) Wholly dependent upon the
nature of the intellect or knowing subject. schopenhauer
argues that behind this illusion (the world
representation) lies the "thing-in-itself" which transcends
the forms of appearance and therefore of our cognitive
functions, and hence which Kant himself maintains as
unknowable. But Schopenhauer identifies the Kantian thing-
in-itself with the will in ourselves and it is from the
standpoint of the SUbject, not me.rely of knowing, but also
m~taphysics of the phenomenal ....orj.d. In his attempt to
explain the whole of experience, Schopenhauer s"'ys that
while the ....orld is representation, phenomena, it is also
will. According to schopenhauer, the ....hole of the
manifest world, all of nature and her phenomena, is 'the
objectification of the will, the blind indifferent,
irrational will, or will-ta-live, that permeates and
underlies all existence.
The only possibility of redemption in the face of this
one, indivisible, eternal, insatiable and insUfferable
will-to-live which manifests itself in all phenomena is
through an immediate knowledge on the part of the
individual of these philosophical truths. Such knowledge,
Schopenhauer holds, can lead to a ~ and total
relinquishment of the will-to-live, or denial of the wi11-
to-live, in which all willing, hence all suffering, ceases
and in which death, when it finally comes, is gladly
embraced with complete and total resignation. It is
finally this Schopenhauerian doctrine of renunciation,
together with the knOWledge and self-conscious freedom
implicit in it, which Kelly finds powerfully illustrated by
Hardy's heroine, Tess.
Helen Garwood also argues that Hardy's art presents
"an excellent illustration of Schopenhauer," particularly
with reference to the doctrine of the striving, insatiable
will or will-to-live as the real or inner nature of the
phenomenal world and the purposelessness of existence
implicit in such a doctrine.' However, Garwood points out
that Hardy never fully embraces Schopenhauer' s final
outcome of a purposeless view of life, asceticism and
renunciation. "In Hardy we have not renunciation, but
resignation" (Garwood, p. 66). Rathec, Garwood says, Hardy
offers a quite different solution to the purposelessness of
existence which can only be understood in the context of an
absolute determinism (in the forms of Fate, Chance etc.)
wherein one can discover neither final purpose nor lasting
peace. It is here, Garwood insists, where the "cause" or
fault of all the world's ills, together with any possible
remedy, is yet to be sought beyond the world and man's
existence in it, that Hardy takes his leave of
Schopenhauer. Hardy ultimately depicts the world as
resul ting from the workings of the Im.'Ilanent and Unconscious
Will, described in all its complexity in "he Oynjlsts
(Garwood, p. 31) ,z In such a world as pictured there,
lHelan Garwood, Thomas Hardy' An Illystration of the
Philosophy of Schopenhauer (Folcroft Press, 1911; rpt. 1969), p.
82.
ZEvidently, Hardy borrows this terminology from Eduard von
Hartmann. In her doctoral dissertation (pp. v, 6off, and
elsewhere), Kelly also discusses Hardy's reading vf Hartmann's
adaptation of Schopenhauer in Tho:> Philgsophy of the Unconscious,
which was translated by W. C. coupland in 1884.
Hardy pre:;ents the single ray of hope and basis for
optimism: the conscious-to-be of the heretofore
unconscious, cosmic ",ill.
While a revie", of the literature confirms
Schopenhauer's influence on Hardy's art, I hope to'
deIllonstrate that. Hardy's overall vision is, in fact, far
from schopenhauerian. specifically, Schopenhauer's
doctrines regarding objective vs. existential self-
con~ciousness, and relative vs. transcendental freedom, get
no airing in Hardy. Accordingly, Hardy's determinism ends
up ~ more and less e~tensive than schopenhauer's,
Hardy's p.:assimism .QQ.tb. more and less thoroughgoing,
irredeemable, ~tc. There is, indeed, a discernible
development wherein Hardy's art moves f:rom a loosely
schopenhauerian philosophical position to positions
progressively less so. I will trace this development in
Hardy's art, beginning with what appears as a faithful
reflection of schopenhauer's vie<;,s on the inexorability of
character, and I will show how Hardy progressively strays
from schopenhauer's views and instead remains locked 1n a
romantic-cum-Darwinian view of the world finally
representing immanentisrn wholly at odds with
Schopenhauer's philosophy. I intend to demonstrate thereby
that Hardy never transcends the empirical/phenomenal
contexts of personalitif!s and circumatances. Specifically,
Schopenhauer's metaphysical theory ot the will,
particularly with respect to the absolute freedc:l it il,
never emerges in Hardy's art.
I wish only to indicate here how illllllensely useful, and
imminently dangerous, it is to view Hardy's artistic
interpretation of Schopenhauer's philosophical position as
in any but a purely aesthetic sensa adequate to that
position. On the contrary, Hardy's literature, without
denying anything of its own power and originality, may be
said to actually distort certain of Schopenhauer's viewB in
so far as the artist's work has been considered by somll
writers and critics as illustrative or "representative" or
the philosopher's thought. The present thesis argues that
while Hardy's writing'S reveal some sympathy with many of
Schopenhauer's views, they are not his own and that any
"philosophy" that underlies Hardy's novels is Hardy's
rather than Schopenhauer' s. Before turning to the work or
Thomas Hardy and its relation to Schopenhlluer's philosophy,
I viII first consider separately Schopenhauer' s most
important contributions to philosophical thought.
1. 8Cr.,)PENHAOER: THE HETAPHY8ICAL BACKGROUND
In his own attempt to discover and explain the inner
nature of the world, Schopenhauer first recognizes, here
following Kant, that to be an object is to be an object for
a sUbject. In accepting sUbjectivity as a given,
presupposed by objectivity of whatever kind, Schopenhauer
is justified in posing the question: What constitutes a
reason or ground of all being for a SUbject, given the
SUbject as the condition of that being? Relative to the
knowing consciousness, the world i.s not without substance,
meaning, or necessity in Schopenhauer's philosophy. He
only insists that one must begin with the knowing SUbject,
and with the SUbject's "rootedness" in the world, in order
to discover how a world, and one with such attributes as
sUbstantial, necessitated, and meaningful properly ascribed
to it, is at all. This quite unique combination of
transcendental idealism with an e:.:~:.tential standpoint, the
embodied SUbject, would profoundly influence the course of
nineteenth and twentieth century thought.
While various commentators and translators of
schopenhauer's works feel free to suggest different
writings by Schopenhauer as both central to his philosophy
as a whole and, at the same time, as useful introductions
to it,] Schopenhauer himself clearly tells hill reader that
his philosophy, in its entirety r is the elaboration of a
single thought and he even specifies where that thought is
to be found originally stated. Schopenhauer insists that
his doctoral thesis of 1813, On the Fourfold Root of the
Principle of SUfficient Reason, preceding his main work by
some five years, is the "introduction and propaedeutic,,4 of
his entire philosophy and is everywhere presupposed by him.
It is in The Fourfold Root that we find the explicit
statement of Schopenhauer's epistemological argument and
the starting-point of his metaphysics, aesthetics and
ethics.
Schopenhauer considers the importance of his doctoral
thesis to rest on the fact that here he folloWs, corrects
where he considers it necessary, and enriChes, Kant's own
philosophy of Reason. schopenhauer's later philosophy
thereby has a firm foundation in his early work and this
latter already contains the possibility of a resolution of
some of the problems arising from Kant's philosophy. In
the lengthy appendix to the first volume of his main work,
]see the introduction by the translator, Konstantin Kolenda,
Essay on the Freedom of the Will (NeW York: Liberal Arts Press,
1960), p. vii.
4Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as will and Representation, 2
vols, trans. E.F.J. Payne (New York: Dover, 1969), I p. xiv.
Unless otherwise noted, all subsequent quotations are from this
edition of schopenhauer's main work, hereafter abbreviated 'till'.
Schopenhauer speaks of his "deeply-felt veneration for and
gratitude to Kant,"S whom he extols as a true genius whose
chief merit is the distinction of the phenomenon from the
thing-in-itself based on his transcendental idealism. In
his first~, Kant's accomplishment is tw....-fold: on
the one hand, he lays down what rational or theoretical
understanding contributes to objective knowledge of the
world a& a condition of the possibility of knowledge as
such, while on the other hand, in establishing the limits
of human understanding, he also limits the reach and scope
of knowledge.
Kant's greatest merit is the distinction of the
phenomenon from the thing-in-itself, based on the
proof that between things and us there always
stands the~, and that on this account
they cannot be known according to what they may
be in themselves. om 1, Appx, pp. 416-17)
It is Descartes who first establishes, through the
cogito and the distinction of mind from body, the
subjective principle which forms the theme of modern
philosophy. Thus, consciousness has only to do with
\ ideas', inclUding certain innate ideas, and not with
things as such. This applies equally to sensibility,
imagination and the understanding. Following Descartes,
the empiricists generally viewed the role of the
understanding in our knowledge of the world as essentially
S.l..!2.i£t., I, p. 417.
passive. As&iqning primacy to exiatence rat.her t.han
consciousness, insisting that there is nothing in
consciousness that is not first in sensation, t.he
empiricists reject t.he Cartesian notion of innate ideas.
Human consciousness, originally an empty vessel, passively
receives 'impressions' from the external world. On the
basis of the passive synthesis of these single impressions,
the understanding builds 'ideas' which thus all originate
with experience. Empiricism develops the
appearance/reality model in a certain passive way which
seeks to account for the categories of objective structures
empirically. that is, without reference to any act of human
consciousness itself.
But with Hurne's philosophy, empiricists must accept
the fact that conclusions reached through empir iCill
reasoning have reference on";' to our ideas, i.e.,
impressions, and not to things as such existing
independently of our perception of them. There is no way
to bridge the gap between the world and our perception of
it. There can be no appeal, as in Cartesian philosophy, to
the veracity of God, a transcendent and therefore
imperceptible being, to provide the bridge. The concepts
of causality, substance, etc. are beliefs arrived at
through experience and the connection of these ideas with
objects as such is without any foundation in empirical
10
reasoning. After Hume, the possibility of objective and
exact knowledge becomes problematic. The problem Hume
raises is essentially a logical one, regarding the
foundations of knowledge through induction and probability,
and Kant's Critique of Pure Reason is the first, and
certainly the most influential attempt to resolve it.
Kant's central thesis is that objective-empirical
knowledge of the world is not in any way a knowledge of
'things themselves' but rather such knowledge is wholly
constituted in consciousness limited to phenomena. In
criticizing and correcting the empiricists' account of the
phenomenon/thing-in-itself dichotomy, Kant insists that
while the content of knowledge remains empirically ~,
the 'objective' world as such is constituted through
categories of an active, synthetic understanding, thereby
rataininq and strengthening the limitation of knowledge to
the phenomenal. Kant, unl!ke the empiricists, views the
human mind :in its relation to objects as something more
than a passive receptivity to sense-impressions upon which
ideas are built. In the first place, Kant demonstrates the
ideality of space and time as pure sUbjective forms of
sensible intuition. In his further thorough and systematic
analysis of the conditions of knowledge moreover, the human
intellect plays an active, not passive, role in the
constitution of objects, providing the determinate rules
11
and principles whereby objects ot experience are
constituted explicitly as objects in and tor consciousness
and not otherwise. He argues that the concepts or
categories ot the understanding are constitutive ot
objects-in-qeneral. as principles of objective synthesis
among phenomena. Here t~en is what is meant by Kant' s
'copernican Revolution' which entails redefininq 'objects'
exclusively as 'objects-for-consciousness'. It is through
the agency ot consciousness that we perceive objects as
having spatial and temporal characteristics and vie.... them
as acting on ono another in causal relations.
For Kant, there is no knowledq8 or reality beyond that
given in experience. He argues, however, that the
possibility of all knowledge depends nonetheless on A
IU:J.2ti conditions lying in the human intellect itself.
which conditions have no other application except to
empirical knowledqe (knowledge of phenomena). This
argument is crucial to thO'! philosophy ot schopenhauer, who
sUlllmarizes its main points in the followinq manner:
He show[s) that the laws which reign with
inviolable necessity in existence, i. e., in
experience generally, are not to be applied to
deduce and exPlain existence itselr; that thus
the validity ot these laws is only relative,
L e., only arises after existence; the world of
experience in general is already established and
present; that consequently tilese laws cannot be
our guide when we come to the explanation of the
existence at the world and of ourselves. au. 11,
12
Kant draws important distinctions between the human
facul ties of sensible intuition (in which phenomena
apprehended in space and time), understanding (as the
facul ty of rules of synthesis whereby the phenomena are
constituted according to categories of 'objectivity-inR
general'), and reason, which is the source of heuristic
principles or regulative ideas governing the ordering of
empirical knowledge. He criticizes the standpoint of
rationalist or transcendent metaphysics at all three
levels: how we only kno'W phenomena and that space and time
are not 'real'; how categories of the understanding (cause,
substance, etc.) are not names or concepts of anything
beyond experience but forms of objective synthesis only;
and ho'W the ideas of reason (psychological, cosmological,
theological) do not address 'absolute objects' or refer in
any way to a 'supersensible' 'World. The final upshot of
the Kantian legacy is that metaphysics, as traditionally
conceived, is an impossibility.
Schopenhauer wholly accepts the 'Aesthetic' part of
Kant's first W~, with its doctrine of the ideality of
space and timg shown by Kant to constitute~ forms
6Arthur S.chopenhauer, ~t:'ld as will and Idea, 3 vols,
tnms. R.B. Haldane and J. Kemp {London: Routledge, 1883). All
references to this translation of Schopenhauer's main work
indicated by the abbreviation .!il as opposed to .!ill.
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of possible experience. He also admires and accepts Kant's
critique of the whole tradition of speculative philosophy
so far as that tradition sought to establish truths on
matters which 1 ie outside what is a possible objEct of
human theoretical understanding. He fully agrees with Kant
that there are~ conditions of experience and its
possibility and that the understanding has legitimate
reference to nothing outside or beyond experience. Our
knowledge is radically limited to that which is given
exclusively in experience; Le., the positive detail of
sense-consciousness -- phenomena. But Schopenhauer
criticizes Kant for retaining too much empirical realism In
his transcendental idealism, namely the notion of a real
world of things-in-themselves somehow still 'out there'
which is, in some mysterious, inexplicable sense, the
ground or cause of our representations. This empiricist
residue Schopenhauer thinks he eliminates by showing that
Kant's error springs from extending the~ principle
of causality illegitimately in his doctrine of the
'unconditioned' (a heuristic principle or COncept of pure
reason), s01Jlething Kant himself elsewhere expressly
forbids. 1 For Schopenhauer, the whole notion of the
'uncondit:i?ne.d', of the thought of an uncaused cause, of an
1see Schopenhauer, !iE, Appx. 434ff. Also Schopenhauer, fB,
21, 26, 34.
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unknowable reason or ground or experience, is an absurd
contradiction. II There simply is no appropriate application
of the concept of causality beyond its use in sUbjectively
determining relations between phenomena. Once this is
established, Schopenhauer thinks, it is clear the notion
that the objective world-for-consciousness in any way
'represents' or is grounded in a world beyond experien~e
must simply be abandoned. The phenomenal, objective world
is the world tor the sUbject who represents it and nothing
Schapenhauer rejects any notion at metaphysical
causality, as in unconditioned, Absolute, or Final Cause.
Whatever is, stands in a relation of necessity to whatever
else is, and in a necessary relation to the knowing subject
always presupposed by its being just that which it is.
Thus, the 'objective universe' is wholly phenomenal, that
is, it exists relatively to human consciousness, its
faculties and forms.
1.1. The principle of Sufficient ReaBon
That causality is the only one of Kant's categories to
playa signiticant role in Schopenhauer's philosophy, is a
crucial point that helps characterize thQ philosophical
Ilschopenhauer, ~. Appx. 479-488.
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positions of both. schopenhauer's 'clarification' of Kant
renders the whole issue of the status of the 'in-itself'
far more intense, since it is no longer sUfficient to
suggest it is somehow 'there' prior to perception, simply
a presumed ground which must be thought but remains
inaccessible and unknowable. It is in Schopenhauer's
disagreement with Kant's account of causality and the
understanding that the former's own positive thought is
discerned.
Schopenhauer takes as the starting-point or his theory
of perception neither the object of knowledge nor the
knowing consciousness but the ..f&.t. that ....e do have ideas or
representations which contain and presuppose both subject
and object, and his peculiar idealism thereby entails
objectivity from the outset. 9 With the exception of
causality, all of Kant's categories of the understanding
are rendered redundant as regards perception, that is,
empirical reality, "for our thinking [i.e., jUdgment] does
not help impart reality to perceptions; this they have in
so far as they are capable of it (empirical reality)
through themselves; but our thinking does serve to
comprehend and embrace the common element and the resUlts
of perceptions, in order to be able to preserve them and
9schopenhauer, !iE, I 7. pp. 25, 34. See also D. W. Hamlyn,
Schopenhauer (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980) pp. 7ft.
,.
manipulate them more easilyU om 1, Appx. p. 443). As
abstract concepts of theoretical reason, schopenhauer
insists that Kantian concepts (categories) are discoverable
through induction and expressible in accordance with the
rules of logic and language.
Where the object-for-consciousness is a physical
object, causality is the obvious, indeed the only, choice
of 'category' as a condition of its possibility. According
to Schopenhauer, all perception presupposes the objective
world which is its only sphere of operation. Mere
sensation, itself wholly sUbjective and governed by the
form of~, time, and therefore always successive,
contains nothing that might he called 'perception'.
schopenhauer submits his own view of the~ nature of
the principle of causality together with empirical support
for his transcendental idealism:
It is only when the Understanding begins to
act, ... only when the understanding applies its
sole form, the causal 1aw, that a powerful
transformation takes place Whereby sUbjective
sensation becomes objective perception. For, in
virtue of its own peculiar form, therefore jl
P.I:..i2I.1., Le.,~ all experience (since there
could have be'!!n none till then) , the
Understanding conceives the given corporeal
sensation as an ~ (a word which the
Understanding alone comprehends), which effect,
as such, necessarily implies a ~.
simultaneously [the Understanding] summons to its
assistance ~, the form of the~ sense
lying likewise ready in the intellect, (Le., the
brain), in order to remove that cause~ the
organism; for it is by this that the external
17
world first arises, space alone rendering it
possible, so that pure intuition £l.....Qr.!2ll must
supply the foundation for empirical perception .
.. . For by [such operations] alone, ... therefore,
exclusively in ... and for the Understanding, does
the real, objective, corporeal world, filling
space in three dimensions, present itself and
further proceed, according to the same law of
causal i ty, to change in time and to move in
space. (U, p. 77_8)10
In The Fourfold Rogt, schCJpenhauer says that the
common function of all the faculties of perception and
thought, together with all the categories of theoretical
reason, have no other significance than as a means by which
objec't:s or representations appear in and for consciousness
and are ordered there.
Our knowing consciousness which manifests itself
~..mLinnerSensibility (or receptivity)
and as Understanding and Reason subdivides
itself into Subject and Object and contains
nothing else To be Object for the Subject and
to be our representation are the same thing
All our representations stand towardso~
in a regulated connection Which may be
determined A PRIORI, and on account of which
nothing existing sepgnl,tely and independently
D.2..th.!n....q sinale or detached can become an Object
~.1\ (£B,see. 16, p. 30, schopenhauer's
10Arthur schopenhauer, ~says' On the Fourfgld RoOt of the
Principle of SUfficient Reason and Qn the Will in Nature, trans.
Mme Karl Hillebrand (London: Bell, 1907). All subsequent
references to Schopenhauer's The Fourfold Root are to this
pUblication of that work, abbreviated m.
IIThis shows clearly hoW directly schopenhauer appeals to the
structure of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. Kant defines
'representation' as the root term applying to sensible intuitions,
imaginative schemata, concepts, ideas, etc., for example, in his
dictum, "The ~~ must be able to accompany all my
representations, to quote;l by Schopenhauer in l1B 1, p. 451.
,.
emphasis)
Here, schopenhauer emphasizes the representational
sUbjective-objective form which indeed pervades all of the
Kantian • faculties'. He interprets this to mean that they
are all specie£ .:f a wholly sUbjective act, representation,
which is determ.i.native of their content. He insists it is
the sole function of the understanding (for Schopenhauer a
faculty of perception and not of judgment, as in Kant) to
create the Objective world, literally re-presenting
(~, to set forth) the raw material supplied by the
senses, through application of the law of causality.
".In perception itself empirical reality, and
consequently experience, is already given; but
perception can also come ubout only by the
application of knowledge of the causal nexus, the
sole function of the understanding, to the
sensation of the senses. Accordingly, perception
is really intellectual, and this is just what
Kant denies [since he does not alloW' the
understanding to be a facUlty of perception]. om
I, Appx., p. 443)
Kant always insists we only have .Q.D,§. mode of intuition
(perception), namely empirical, and that the one thing we
absolutely do not have is \ intellectual intuition'. But in
schopenhauer. the intellect is nothing but the
understanding and the understanding is a faculty of
perception. Schopenhauer criticizes Kant for his failure
to recognize the centrality of sense-consciousness and the
world-creating role of the principle of causality in
"
perception. Identifying objective/perceived with
physical/corporeal, Schopenhauer quite radical.ly asserts
that the physical world~ is in no way different
from the world construed in consciousness through
intellectual intuition. He expresces the mutual
conditionality or relative necessity among phenomena and
between these. and the knowing sUbject by a statement of the
principle of sufficient reason borrowed from Wolff:
IINothing is without a reason for its being lt (m, sec 5, p.
5) . With regard to the physical world, this reason is
expressed by the principle of causality .
... [In the class of physical objects] this law
refers solely and exclusively to~ of
material states and to nothing else whatever;
cons:equently, ... it ought not to be brought in
when ~ are not in qnestion. The law of
causality is the regulator of the~
undergone in Time by objects of our outer
~; but these objects are all material.
Each change can only be brought about by another
having preceded it, which is determined by a
rule, and then the new change takes place as
being necessarily induced by the preceding one.
This necessity is the causal nexus. (.fE,sec. 20,
p. 40).
It is the understanding, by means of its own peculiar
function, which creates the basis of the whole complex of
empirical reality as a general and comprehensive
representation. Whila there is one principle of sufficient
reason with its single role, that is, to determine the
necessary relation among representations and between these
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and the representing consciousness, there are different
applications or expressions of this principle according to
the characteristics of the representation to which it is
applied. Schopenhauer, largely following his predecessors,
says that there are four applications, hence the' fourfold
root' of the principle of sufficient reason. In addition
to empirical objects belonging to the physical world, or
the realm of becoming, which is governed by the principle
of sufficient reason in the form of the law of causality,
he finds that there are three other classes of objeots or
representations for the subjeot: ro'\tional or abstract
(Ultimately based on perceptual experience), mathematical
(based on the pure intuitions of time and spaoe) and
motivational. Each of these classes of objects or
representations, of knowing, of being, and of acting,
respectively, is governed by its own peculiar form of the
principle of sufficient reason. The laws of reason and
truth (logic) determine rational abstract
representations in the sphere of knowing; laws governing
the determinate relations of space and time (geometry and
arithmetic) hold sway in the class or being; and
motivation, a peCUliar form of causality, is operative in
the sphere of action. The whole of "objective reality" is
thus governed by the simple~ forms of Time, Space,
and causality.
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The four laws of our cognitive facUlty, of which
the principle of SUfficient Reason is the common
expression, by their cOl1Ullon character as well as
by the fact that all objects for the Subject are
divided amongst them, proclaim themselves to be
posited by one and the same primary quality and
inner peculiarity of our knowing faculty, which
faculty manifests itself as Sensibility,
Understanding. and Reason. (rn, sec. 52, p. 188-
89)
The crux of Schopenhauer's theory of perception and
knowledge is to be found in the following statement.
The principle of SUfficient Reason in all its
forms is the sale principle and the sole support
of all necessity. For~ has no other true
and distinct ,neaning than that of the
infallibility of the consequence when the reason
is posited. Accordingly every necessity is
~: absolute, Le., unconditioned,
necessity therefore is a contradictio in adiecto.
For to be necessary can never mean anything but
to result from a given reason. U:B, p. 181)
As to the inner nature of the world. the answer to this
question must lie outside the poles of the subjective-
objective relativity of knowing consciousness, this purely
finite relationship of human perception to what '1ppears in
it. It is this question of the in-itself which becomes the
center of Schopenhauer's main work. schopenhauer
assimilates the whole sphere of consciousness
(representation), whether perception, (traditionall)'
understood as the representation of 'real' as opposed to
merely posited objects), imagination, or conceptual
reasoning, to the single form of representation, the
understanding's sole function being the assigning of
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'causes' within the ltIorld of representation. The aimed-for
and unavoidable consequence of Schopenhauer's theory of
objectivity is that~ of consciousness, not even
reason, does the subject have access to knowledge of 'the
real' •
1.2. The Worll! as will
In The World as Will and Representation, Schopenhauer
moves beyond that consciousness for which the world is
utterly phenomenal to the Rll-consciousness of the rea~,
'embodied' sUbject. schopenhauer expressly pushes the
Kantian thesis, that the objective world we merely ltnow and
reason about is but a phenomenal world-far-consciousness
and nothing more, to its radical limit: he argues
accordingly that the sUbject of merely objective-rational
or theoretical-reflective consciousness is only a pole in
a secondary, sUbjective-objective relation, not the real
sUbject of bodily self-awareness.
[The sUbject] is rooted in th[e] world; and thus
finds himself in it as an~, in other
words, his knowledge, which is the conditional
supporter of the whole world as representation,
is nevertheless given entirely through the medium
of a body, and the affections of this body are
.•. the starting-point for the understanding in
its perception of this world. om, sec. 18, p.
99)
Schopenhaucr says that the objective world of human reality
presupposes an ultimate reality and our understanding of
the nature of the former provides a fundamental clue about
the latter. This is because the body of the knowing
subject is actually given in two ways. In section 22 of
n, Schopenhauer defines the body of the knowing subject as
'the immediate object'. He cautions that this term is to
be understood in a figurative sense, since the body 9J.lB
body, and not merely the sUbject of sensations, is known as
an object in space just as any other object there is known,
that is, J.ruli~, through the media'Cion of the
understanding. That which is the J.mmediatl.! object is the
body as~ wheroin sensations become transformed
through application of the law of causality to~ of
a 'cause' outside the organism itself. This is
Schopenhauer's 'proof' of the~ nature of the
principle of causality: that, "although the perception of
the body's sensations is absolutely immediate, (governed
solely by the form of inner sense, time), yet the body
it£Qlf is by no means presented as object ... " (.fB sec. 22,
p. n).
It is the bodily organism Which is the starting-place
of all experience without itself entering into that
experience as such. While the body is apprehended as an
object among all the other objects of the world, it is at
the same time given immediately and independent of
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representation (unconditioned) in a way Schopenhauer
denotes by the word H1ll. This notion of two senses of
one's body - as representation, Le., as object of
perception determined by the principle of sufficient reason
along with other objects on the one hand, and on the other
as immediately-given nalJ..tY in so far as the body is the
affectively self-given sUbject, there immediately for
itself in illlin9. and in H.iJ.l...ing, and hence 2D.lY my body
and D.Q.t an object of perception (representation) - is
central to Schopenhauer's metaphysics. Schopenhauer says
that every true act of will is a movement of the body such
that this willing entails awareness of the identity of body
and will. Where the body is regarded as an object among
other objects in space, its actions, movements, changes in
states and conditions, are causally, i. e., necessarily
linked, to those other objects. But there is no relation
of causality between the raising of my arm and my willing
to reach for the light switch. The former is merely the
outward manifestation of the latter; regarded from the
inside, the two are one and the same. Schopenhauer
expresses this identity of body/will as follows: "The
action of the body is nothing but the act of will
objectified, Le., translated into perception" (ilB,sec. 18,
p. 100).
ThUS, Schopenhauer's will is not will in the usual
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sense of the word, but pure affect, the self-objectifying
act which at once cancels that and returns to itself.
Knowledge of the will is presupposed by knowledge of the
body and its acts in time. Schopenhauer says that this
"philosophical truth" of the identity of body and will can
never be demoli~;:rated but only variously explained. He
instantiates the immediacy of this relation of real to
phenomenal in the individual in variov.s ways, in the
psycho-somatic nature of the emotions, for instance, or the
dependency of one's morals upon one's given character. His
real interest, however, is in the metaphysical
implications.
My body and my will are one; or, What as
representation of perception I call my body, I
call my will in so far as I am conscious of it in
an entirely different way comparable with no
other; or, My body is the objectivitv of my will;
or, Apart from the fact that my body is my
representation, it is still my will, and so on.
(HR, sec. 18, p. 102)
This existential awareness of oneself as \illl is "entirely
different" precisely in being utterly unmediated: it is
what is presupposed in any sUbjective-objective distinction
such as one finds in theoretical or moral self-
consciousness. As will, one encounters one's own inner
nature, before any reflective self-objectification. It is
as will that one knows one is absolutely and uniquely
oneself and no one else, while in Objective terms, there is
2'
really no difference between one's own phenomenal body and
anyone else's.
schopenhauer then takes a controversial step - from
the instance (my body as will) to the generality (the world
as will) - wherein lies what Schopenhauer believes to be
the clue to a wider metaphysical principle. Here, in this
alleged immediate truth of human self-consciousness, is
Schopenhauer's defence against the charges of theoretical
egoism and solipsism.
From all these considerations the reader has now
gained in the abstract. .. a knowledge which
everyone possesses directly in the concrete,
namely as feeling, •.. a knowledge that the inner
nature of his own phenomenon, which manifests
itself to him as representation is his rlU.
. . . The reader who haR gained this conviction,
will find that of itself it will become the key
to the knowledge of the innermost being of the
whole of nature, since he now transfers it to all
those phenomena that are given to him, not like
his own phenomenon both in direct and in indirect
knowledge, but in the latter solely, and hence
merel y in a one-sided way, as representation
alone. (lffi, sec. 21, p. 109)
Through application of the causal. laws, we are conscious,
embodied sUbjects, of other phenomena. The
representation of my body is in this sense not merely
similar to my representation of other bodies, but in
another sense dependent upon these latter, on their
movement (action, actuality) in relation to my body. Yet
we have seen that the movement of one's own body is merely
the objectivity of the will with which it is one.
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Therefore, says Schopenhauer:
we. shall ... assume that as, on the one hand,
[these other bodies] are representation, just
like our body, and are in this respect
homogeneous with it, so on the other hand, if we
set aside their existence as the sUbject's
representations, what still raJllains over must be,
accol."ding to its inner nature, the same as what
in ourselves we call It.U..l. (HE, sec.19, p. 105)
This crucial insight into the nature of an act of will,
from the standpoint of one's 2!!D affective reality, as the
innermost nature of the phenomenal world, provides the
possibility for transition from the JIIerely phenomenal to
the real: all representation is the Objectivity of one's
will and is, at the same time, the self-objectification of
the same will which exists as the innertllost natUl"e of the
phonomenal world, independent of and apart from all spatio-
te.mporal and causal determinations.
From his analysis of the nature of the world as
representation, schopenhauer thus moves toward knOWledge of
the thing-In-itself as first intimated in one's own
affective reality. The JIIanifestations of will vary
enormously from the lowest (inorganic nature) where it
sho....s itself as forces operating in accordance with
universal law-s, to the highest (organic) nature, where it
manifests itself in the~ actions of man. But
this known plurality, arising from the~ conditions
of all knowledge, is through and through~. As
2.
regards the thing-in-itself, there is no plurality of
wills; there is just will. " ...This thing-tn-itself,
considered as such apart from phenomenon, ... lies outside
time and space, and accordingly knows no plurality, and
consequently is mlI." am, sec. 25, p. 128). And yet, the
will is not 'one' in the sense ot Par-enides, or spinoza,
or even Leibniz; it has in it the~ meaning ot an
ultimate 'absolute' affective reality. While
Schopenhauer says he uses the term \will' to denote this
absolute because that is the form in which we discover it
in ourselves, the forms in which it manifests itself in
nature etc. still bear the psychic character of a
subjective, selt-expressive~.
Schopenhauer observes the outward harmony and
accoJlllDodation in nature generally but reflects on the inner
antagonism of the .etaphysical viII towards itself, a
blind, instinctive, primordial urging whose outward
manifestation is the world. The consequent vision ot
worldly existence as a purposeless, insatiable, violent
struggle for survival and self-assertion seemed to many at
his own and later generations merely the articulation and
explanation of an immediately-felt truth.
2.
1.3. Buaan Mature and Pessi.i••
In his essay, Qn Human Nature,1Z Schopenhauer
pessimistically and harshly asserts:
Every man ... has something in his nature which is
positively evil. " .For it was just in virtue of
this evil in hi., this bad principle, that of
necessity he became a man. And for the same
reason the world in general is what my clear
mirror of it has shown it to be. . .. l1an is at
bottom a savage, horrible beast: ... no animal
ever torments another for the mere purpose of
tormenting, but man does it, and it is this that
constitutes that diabolical feature in his
character ",hich is so much worse than the merely
animal. . .. In every man there dwells a colossal
egoism..•. (At] the heart of every man there lies
a wild beast whIch waits for opportunities to
stOIlll and rage in its desire to inflict pain on
others or ... to kill them. It is this whIch is
the source of all lust of war and battle. OiH,
pp. 15-22)
Even the act of objectification by which the illusion of an
ordered universe comes about tor man Is nothing other than
the product of a partiCUlar manifestation of will, namely
the brain of this absurd hUlllan brute. To view hUllIan
reasonings and purposings in proper Schopenhauerian tens
one must understand theJll to be essentially nothing but the
peculiar techniques this partiCUlar species uses t>;) satisfy
its insatiable will-to-live, its egoistic craving to try to
conform. the whole of reality to itself, representing it as
12Arthur Schopenhauer, Qn Human Nat.ure, trans. Thomas Bailey
Saunders (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1957). All references
to this essay are from this text, abbreviated Illi.
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if it were entirely subject to its own will. Thus we see
in nature, including human nature so far as schopenhauer is
concerned, cause for a radical pessimism, since everything
that particularly and contingentlY exists, being also an
obj ectification of will, is impelled necessarily to render
itself absolute. Hence we see, for example, that lIin his
unrelenting cruelty man is in no way inferior to the tiger
and the hyaena," (lili, p. 18), his rationalizing only more
efficient than mere physical strength or speed of movement
as the means by which the will strives to realize itself
absolutely.
Schopenhauer's philosophy establishes the
philosophical~ (as distinct from the state of mind)
of nihilism/pessimism as a counter-concept to classical
skepticism or that of the seventeenth-century, as well as
to the implicit optimism of the philosophy of the
enlightenment era which he radically opposes. Since the
Whole phenomenal world is nothing but a product of the
reflexivity of the human consciousness, nothing is exempt
from will's all-manifesting and all-nihilating power. The
noblest human passions are no different in principle from
the blind struggle for survival of animals and plants or
the push and pUll of electro-magnetic or gravitational
energios in elemental nature. They are different only
objectively; in themselves they are but grades of the one
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primal, coslllic impulsivity of will. The representation of
an objective world in lIIan is the highest expression of will
only in this sense: in it the utter contingency and
groundlessness of the world as the outward manifestation of
will is finally and explicitly revealed. This ephemerality
is least evident in the expression of will in elemental
nature, where inorganic mechanisms seem to possess a
certain brute reality and endurance. Schoponhauer assorts
that in the successive stages of organic life, the
essential separation of '01111 and intellect is increasingly
revealed. The intellect is, after all, together with the
higher forms of organic life, a relative late·comer, a fact
through which something more of the groundlessness of
objective existence is recognized. Thus life, that is,
will or will-to-live, is Wholly revealed as a ceaseless,
violent struggle for survival and an endless reproductiva
iteration of living and dying as organisllls, plant, animal
and human, manifest their phenomenality in the impermanence
and instability of their existence.
But it is in the limitlesn vanity of the human ego
that the utter nagativity of merely objective existence is
most explicitly expressed. In unremitting scheming,
speCUlating and manipulating, we seek in endless ways to
SUbject the world to our will. The trUly wise individual
comprehends the wholly illusory nature of positive
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existence in its essential temporality, purposelessness,
and absurdity. Anyone who has thus pierced the veil of
'Maya', or illusion, will know that even the most precious
ideals or the most universal and clever explanations of
things are the mere by-products of the consciousness which
presupposes the organism which, in turn, presupposes the
will. There is no access to the inner nature of the world,
to the 'absolute', through reason: reason is but the most
highly refined survival technique of the irrational
metaphysical will.
Thus disciplined to know the world as l!!.AYil, illusion,
and even less than illusion, one will want to deny in
oneself the incessant urging of the egoistic will and the
pointless, endless round of SUffering it entails. The
individual will then be moved to observe the world
dispassionately, apart from all self-interest, seeking only
to contemplate how ultimate reality, being-in-itself,
manifests itself in nature in l'Ianifold ways, everywhere and
always demonstrating the utter phenomenality of all world-
manifestation. Within this state, "the perceived
individual thing is raised to the IdeaLS of its species,
1JHere is Schopenhauer's adaptation of the Platonic doctrine
of ideas. Schopenhauer explains in his theory of art that between
the particular phenomenon and the thing-in-itself the idea "c:tands
as the only direct objectivity of the will, since it has not
assumed any other form pecUliar to knowledge as such, except that
of the representation in general, Le., that of being an object for
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and the knowing individual to the pure sUbject of will-less
}moving, and now the two, as such, no longer stand in the
stream of time and of all other relations" (1m. sec. 38, p.
197) • Schopenhauer views the character of contemplative
consciousness as essentially aesthetic, and of such a
nature as to be capable of overcoming the limitations ot
ordinary thought and knowledge. In will-less contemplation
of what is~ to an object or objects, (in
schopenhauer, the idea, or the single~ act of the
metap~ysical vill) , one attains to an A.l.b§...lt momentary and
fl'.:eting state of freedom from the suttering and want of
the .... ill.
It is thus only in the aesthetic or emotive mode of
contemplation that the apprehension ot the pure forms of
....ill's spontaneous operations is possible, a contellplation
which itself, ho....ever, is quite passionless. In this
contemplative state the pure fatality that lies at the very
bottom of things is revealed to one for whom the world must
now cease to have any interest or hold ....hatever. This
detachment is not the result of thought or discursive
reason; rather it follows only upon :t:'adiCetl suspension of
the theoretical standpoint. As 'Je have seen, this kind of
a SUbject" CD 1, ii, sec. 32, p. 175). For Schopenhauer, there is
only one idea, since the thing-in-itself 'Jhich is directly manifoat
in it is itself one and indivisible.
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detachment, hitherto unknown in the history of western
philosophy, is the stand-point of a radical pessimism and
it is for schopenhauer the basis of an affirmation, the
means of a certain liberation froln the gods, if not from
tate. 1' It is a real or existential, that is, an affective
detachment, whose first fruit is the recognition that the
apparent independence of the world is, after all, illusion,
pure expressionism 1 nothing but the work of the same will
that is also one's own reality. with this insight, one is
able to say with the Vedantic mystic, "I am all this
creation collectively, and besides me there exists no other
being" (liR, sec. 34, p. 181, n. 13). ThUS, the
schopenhauerian pessimist achie7es a certain overcoming of
the alienating division between self and world. There is
life beyond the meddling intellect: flI and reality are
one". Pessimism is the gatewey through which one must pass
to arrive at this state of 'higher consciousness'.
The general outline of schopenhauer's ethics, founded
as it is on presumably empirical facts of human existence
(self-consciousness, egoism, malice, and compassion), is
adumbrated in what has already been discussed. It is in
"schopenhauer often alludes to the philosophies ot the east
seeing in these a paradigm for his own renunciatory philosophy. In
Schopenhauer. Peter Gardiner says that a statue of Buddha and a
bust of Kant were the only ornaments to be found in Schopenhauer's
austere living quarters (p. 21)
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his two essays on ethics, Qn the Freedom of the will 15 and
On the Basis of Morality16, that schopenhauer most clearly
articulates his views on the possibility of ethics and
human mor.!lity. These themes are central to Hardy's
literature since they strike at the very heart of what it
specifically means to be a human being, to live, to work,
and to die. Bath writers are generally spoken of as
pessimists and their writings are included in what might be
called the literature of pessimism. In the essays of
schopenhauer to be discussed below, the essence of this
characterization of his vision is explicitly expressed.
The question as to whether or not Schopenhauerian pessimism
is that pessimism which is reflected in the quite
fatalistic and deterministic pessimism of Hardy's works
will then be explored.
15Arthur Schapenhauer, Essay on the Freedom of the Will, trans.
Kanstantin Kolenda, (Indianapolis/New York: Babbs-Merrill, Library
of Liberal Arts, 1966). All references to this war}: will be found
iii this text, abbreviated fll.
16Arthur Schapenhauer, On the Basis gf Mgulity, trans. E.F.J.
Payne, iotro. Richard Taylor (Indianapolis: Babbs-Merrill, 1965).
All references to this work are to this edition, abbreviated 1!M.
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2. SCROPENHAUER: THE ETHICS OJ' PESBIM..;.SM.
For schopenhauer, as we hZllve seen, the whole of
perception is objectification or manifestation of the will;
what it expresses is simply the wiU-to-live, the
continuation of existence throughout all the gradations of
the will's self-objectification. This is the innermost
nature of the world as, also, of our own innermost being.
In schopenhauer's philosophy, each phenomenon expresses in
itself, in its species-being, the inner necessity of the
gradations of all the will's phenomena, inseparable from
the adequate objectivity of the wilL This objectivity is
reflected in the whole of nature and is intelligibly
expressed, according to schopenhauer, in the Platonic
ideas, although for schopenhauer there is really only one
idea. Schopenhauer defines 'idea' as nevery definite and
fixed grade of the will's objectification, in so far as it
is thing-in-itself and is therefore foreign to plurality"
nm, I, ii, sec. 25, n. 11, p. 130).
Thus the intelligible character coincides with
the Idea, or more properly with the original act
of will that reveals itself in the Idea.
Therefore to this extent, not only the empirical
character of every person, but also that of every
animal species, nay, of every plant species, and
even of every original force of inorganic nature,
is to be regarded as phenomenon or manifestation
of an intelligible ch;lracter, in other words, of
an indivisible act of will that is outside time.
om, 1, i1. sec. 28, p. 156)
37
As a consequence of the above distinction between the
intelligible and empirical character, Schopenhauer places
all freedom in the sphere of being (the will and its
~ manifestation, the idea), all necessity in the
sphere of existence (nature and the. sum-total of all
phenomena and activity). The intelligible character is
manifest in the whole conduct and life of the individual
and constitutes the empirical character. This last is
determined by the fixed and unalterable intell.igible
character and flows necessarily from it. All the acts of
the individual, animal or human, are called forth by
intellectually-presented motives, but even in the
~ acts of man, these acts are always in accordance
with fixed intelligible character.. While the lower animal
responds only to what is immediately present, man, with his
higher powers of reason and memory, operates from elective
choice. That is, his understanding can survey any number
of motives, present or otherwise, yet that choice which
finally determines his particular act is always of a
partiCUlar type and always presupposes his intelligible
character which governs it.
ThUS, while man has the conviction that he is free,
that he possesses liberum arbitrium indifferentiae, this
belief is based on an illusion. His is only a relative
(~) freedom, relative both to the principle of
3'
sufficient reason. and to the kind of individual (rational)
he is. The essential character of every being expresses
the special will of its species and manifests the fixed and
eternal gradations of the objectification of will through
time. An individual may know~ 1. e, prior to and
independent of all experience, .thAt he is, !lm.t he feels or
is affected, but only as an objective entity. an object
among other objects, can he know~ he is or~ affects
him. Therefore, the individual can only corne to know
himself a posteriori, since "he II once for all, and
subsequently knows ~ he is" (JiB, sec. 55, p. 293).
Schopenhauer writes extensively on morality and
ethics, attempting to give to these a mataphysical
foundation. Matters concerning moral conduct and ethical
belief are discussed at length in his main work,~
as wi)] and Representation as well as the in the
collection of his writings, Parerga and paralipomena.
However, the most thorough-going discussion on this topic
is found in the two essays, On the Freedom of the will and
On the Foundation of l12nl1£i.17 It is in the second
HFor a more thorough discussion of Schopenhauer's philosophy
in general, and his moral philosophy in particular, I refer the
reader to several works which I have found extremely helpful here:
Frederick Copleston, S.J., Arthur Scbopenbauer' Philosopher of
~ (London: Burns, Oates &: Wasbbourne, 1946). D. W. Hamlyn,
Schopenhauer (London: Routledge & Kegan paul, 1980), esp. pp.
123ff. Patrick Gardiner, Schopenhauer (Baltimore: Penguin, 1963).
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chapter of the latter essay that Xant' s contribution to the
whole realm of moral value and ethics is intensely
scrutinized and 'clarified'. Here also is the starting--
point of Schopenhauer's own moral ptlilosophy.
2.1. critique of ltantian Morality
In the Preface to the second edition of his first
~, Kant says that he "found it necessary to deny
~, in order to make room for tAilJl. "I' For Kant,
the unitary principles or 'ideas of reaaon' are J.1nItl.J&s1 in
an analysis of experience thereby serving as the foundation
of a~ faith in the real and abiding existence of
God, of the universe as His creation, in iJllDlortality, and
in ourselves as moral agents. Accepting as given the
premise that morality necessarily presupposes freedom (in
the strictest sense) as a property of our will, Kant
explains the possibility of freedom and Jlorality (in
reference to the human soull as follows:
..• If our~ is not in error in teaching
that the obj ect is to be taken in a twofold
~, nalllely as appearance and as thing in
itself: if the deduction of the concepts of the
understanding is valid, and the principle of
causality therefore applies only to things taken
"Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp
Smith (London: Macmillan, 1929), p. 29. Any references to Kant's
first~ will be to this pUblication.
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in tbe former sense, namely in so far as they are
objects of experience--these same objects, taken
in the other sense, not being suhject to the
principle--then there is no contradiction in
supposing that one and the same will is, in the
appearance, that is, in its visible acts,
necessarily subject to the law of nature, and so
far~, while yet, as belonging to a thing
in itself, it is not SUbject to that law, and is
therefore~ (~, Pre£. p. 28)
Accord Ing to Rant, we cannot .!wQK noumena or things-
in-themselves. The categories of human understanding are
limited to the domain of empirical experience, of
phenomena, and although the mind can conceive of a
supersensible object (eg. the soul), the mind cannot
produce knowledge of such a transcendent entity. That is,
metaphysical concepts such as the self (as originator of
all my acts and bearer of all my representations), being as
such, Final Cause (the unconditioned) highest
intelligence, are not matters of experience and, if known
at all, must be known in some other way. These
metaphysical concepts, or what Kant calls 'transcendentcd
ideas', can never be~ of knowledge, but neither are
they vain illusions; they are natural to reason and do have
a~ use. Thes~ heuristic ideas or concepts
function as regulative maxims in guiding our scientific
enquiry. Kant attempts to show that our relation to the
world is not lim!ted to scientific knowledge (fact); we do
~ in the world and thus enter into a realm of moral
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value. In the Preface to the second edition of his first
~, he says that the limits of scientific
understanding (empirical knowledge), as ascertained in his
~, serve not merely to furnish assurance as to the
grounds for certitude concerning scitlotific knowledge.
These limits also point to a reason operative in practical
life. That is, there are certain !L..RX..i2.ti propositions or
principles of reason which constitute the moral order or
realm of value and practical life. For Kant, the most
fundamental principles of practical, moral life (human
freedom, the existence of God, the immortality of the soul)
are completely independent of empirical experience and the
principles which govern it. Our knowledge of what we .Q.Y..9h.t
to do is prior to and more certain than any scientific
findings.
Kant begins his moral philosophy with the
presupposition that we live in a moral world and that,
though we experience different moral obligations, the
experience of an 'ought' is universally shared. According
to :Kant, to act morally is not to act from inclination or
even prudence but from a sense of duty. And dutiful action
derives its necessity not from its consequences but from
the conformity of such actions with some general law which
can serve the will as a principle of action. Such a moral
law is a 'fact of reason' since it is not an empirical fact
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but announces itself as originally legislative. II' The form
of this originally legislative principle is the categorical
imperative: "so act that the maxim of your will could
always hold at the same time as a principle establishing
universal law" (~, p. 30). Kant holds that we respect
the moral law because it is a law which we, as rational
beings, legislate for ourselves and voluntarily obey.
Moral commands are not derived from any external source,
such as divine ordinance. He denies any theological
foundation for his theory of ethics. Rather, knowledge of
God is to be viewed as a postulate of moral reason. This
is Kant's 'copernican Revolution' in theology. Morals are
not grounded in theology: on the contrary, the fundamental
beliefs of religion find their support in pure practical
reason and its principle of morality.zo
Contrary to his general acceptance (with the required
'clarification' on points of detail and doctrine) of Kant's
first ~, Schopenhauer rejects Kant's moral
philosophy as ent.LJ""J.y unfounded. Schopenhauer's criticism
on the whole is, of course, directly related to that of the
1l'Kant, critique of Practical Reason, trans. Lewis White Beck
(Indianapolis/New York: Bobbs-Herrill, Library of Liberal Arts,
1956), p. 18-19. All subsequent references to this work will be to
this edition and employ the abbreviation ~.
2OKant, gga, p. 137ff. On this point, see also James C.
Livingston, Modern Christian Thought· From the Enlightl!nment to
~ (NOW York: Macmillan, 1971). p. 69.
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first~ in the areas of perception, tho nature and
content of the understanding, the nature and role of the
principle of causality in objectivity, and the nature of
the faculty of reason, which have already been discussed.
He admires Kant's theory of freedom and its emphasis on the
distinction between objects and things-in-themselves,
between objective reason and moral or 'practical' reason.
But he utterly rejects Kant's admonition that a metaphysics
of morals must have a non-empirical source, derived not
from certain~ of human nature, but from abstract self-
subsistent reason, just as he rejects Kant's notion of the
impossibility of a metaphysics of the phenomenal world.
There are a number of specific but fundamental points in
Kant's theory of 1Il0rality which Schopenhauer analyses and
rejects as either false or absurd.
schopenhauer criticizes the assumption of the
imperative form (the ~ or 'moral law') of Kantian
ethics, together with all its 'legalistic' terms (eg.
'law', 'absolute obligation', and 'unconditioned duty' .21
In the absence of the 'theological hypotheses' from which
all such 'imperatival' ideas first emerge, hypotheses from
which Kant pointedly separates them, these concepts are no
longer even intelligible. All such ideas are intelligible
21 5ee Hamlyn, pp. 123-55.
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only in relation to the idea of a superior power capable of
enforcing its laws 'through a system of reward and
punishment. Yet, in attempting to discover the kind of
world required by the fact of the moral law, Kant
ultimately comes forward with the existence of God and the
promise of immortality as postulates or conditions demanded
by reason itself in its quest for happiness and the Good. 22
Schopenhauer will have nothing to do with this rational
theology and he points out the ambiguity in Kant's view.
Every ought is necessarily conditioned by
punishment or reward; consequently, to use Kant's
language, it is essentially and inevitably
hypothetical, and never categorical, as he
asserts. But if all those conditions are thought
away, the concept is left without meaning; and so
absolute obligation is certainly a contrr'Jictio
~. (lm II 4. p. 55)
Schopenhauer alludes to Kant's Foundations of the
Metaphysics of Morals, where he points out that Kant
undertakes there to provide an~ foundation of
ethics, and furthermore that Kant insists this foundation
" 'must not be sought in man's nature (the SUbjective) or
in the circumstances of the world (the objective) , and that
'here nothing whatever can be borrowed from knowledge
relating to man Le. from anthropolggy'" (qtd. with
emphasis by Schopenhauer in mI, II 6, p. 61-2). In order
ZZxant, .Qf.B, p. 137£f.
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to provide such a pure concept~, valid for all
rational beings (tor Kant, man is but one species belonging
to this genus), Kant looks to the abstract concept of
universal validity, Le., valid equally tor all rational
beings, to provide substance to the notion confoI1lity to
m contained in his statement ot the categorical
Imperative quoted above,a Thus in Kantian ethics, self-
subsistent 'reason', that is, indellend(lnt of human nature,
legislates for 1t.§..I.ll and consequently for all men In so
far as they are rational beings.
Having exarnin(ld and rejected Kant's procedure here,
schopenhauer demonstrates that the notions of 'absolute
worth' and 'the necessity of an action out of respect for
the law' are simply without meaning since all evaluations
are compa.rative of one thing in referenc8 to another and
the word 'respect' in relation to law always means
'obedience' together with the notions of enforcement,
reward, and punish_nt. But it is in the area of boral
conscience that Schopenhauer registers his greatest
objections to Kantian ethics since here, according to
Kant's categorical Imperative, the mind is " a complete
court of justice with trial, proceedings, jUdge,
prosecutor, counsel tor the defense, and sentence" (8M, II
llSchopenhauer, .IR1, II 6, p. 73.
'6
9, p. 105). In schopenhauer's view, moral self-judgment
originates from an ~, rather than an~
For conscience is precisely the acquaintance with
ourselves which arises from ou:. own mode of
conduct and which becomes more and more intilt'"lte.
Thus, though the~ (what we do) does, of
course, furnish the occasion, it is really the
~ (what we are) that is incriminated by
conscience. As we are conscious of~ only
through the medium of responsibility, the former
must also lie where the latter is to be found,
and hence in the~ (what we are). The~
(what we do) 1s subject to necessity; but only
~ do we become acquainted with others
as with our£lelves, and we have no a priori
knowledge of our character. (m:1, II 10, p. 113)
Even if a law can tell a man that he £il.n...Q.Q that which
he 'wills' (since his doing is merely the outward
manifestation of his willing) universallY, the question
remains as to what it is that he can truly 'will'. In his
essay, Qn the Freedom of the will schopenhauer thinks he
answers thIs question, at least negatively, and places that
'freedom' which is for Kant a 'fact of reason' in a true
light.
2.2. Necessity, Freedom, and Intelligible character
Schopenhauer holds that metaphysical insights
regarding nature as such, and human nature and volition in
particular, furnish an understanding both of their true
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essence and of the inherent character of universal will.
Here, he takes as the starting-point of his ethics, man's
alleged double knowledge of the nature and activity of his
body: as representation and as will. The actions of the
body are seen as objectifications of the will and thus
identical (not in any causal relation) with the wilL
Schopenhauer thus accepts the fact of the assertion of
freedom in inner consciousness, "I can ao what I will," in
so far as this "refers (oJnly) to the ability to act in
accordance with the will. ...The self-consciousness affirms
the freedom of action--when the willing is presupposed.
But what is inquired into is precisely the freedom of
~" (FW, p. 16). In complete agreement with his
views as set down in The Fourfold Root, schopenhauer
insists that all actions are determined by motives
(causes); there is no such thing as liberum arbitrium
illii~ - an absolutely free will. The motive is a
cause, and it operates with the necessity entailed by all
This necessity is easy to see in the case of the
animal whose intellect is simpler and thUG
furnishes only knowledge of the present. Man's
intellect is double; in addition to knOWledge of
intuitive perception, he has also abstract
knowledge, and this is not bound to the present;
in other words, he has the faculty of reason
(~). He therefore has an elective
decision with clear consciousness; thUG he can
balancQ mutually exclusive motives as such one
against the other, in other words, he can let
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them try their strength on his will; whereupon
the more powerful motive then dp-=ides him, and
his action ensues with preci '-ely the same
necessity with which the rol:". tlg of a ball
results from its being struck. (lb. sec. 20, p.
72)
There is, according to Schopenhauer (above, and fli,
pp. 36-37), a relative free will made possible by man's
capacity to think. to deliberate. This deliberation results
in a relative freedom (a 'modified determinism', Le.,
circumstances together with character) from an immediate
determination to action in relation to objects perceived as
present and as motives for the will, as in the case of
animals. The thoughts that the deliberation produces,
however, function precisely as motives, determining the
will just as much as do objects perceived as present.
Schopenhauer agrees that in any particular set of
circumstances the individual considers various
possibilities or alternatives (motives). But these are, as
with all causes, necessarily physical possibilities and the
realization of anyone of them depends on which motive is
operative. schopenhauer introduces the concept of
~ and its relations through motives with action. He
appreciates, in the sphere of human action, the force of
the determinist thesis which he fully embraces. He says:
••• lI man does at all times only what he wills, and yet he
does this necessarily. But this is due to the fact that he
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already II what he wills. For from that which he ll, there
follows of necessity everything that he, at any time, slQu"
(Dl, p. 98).
For Schopenhauer, what is commonly called the
'character' of an individual never changes over the entire
course of the individual's life and this character
manifests itself in what motives detenuine the individual
to action. Any suggestion to the contrary, as far as
Schopenhauer is concerned, is to imply "an existence
without an essence, which means that something 1§. and at
the same time~, which in tur.n means ~, and
consequently is a self-contradictio,"l" (EN.. p. 60)"
Schopenhauer also draws an important distinction between
the whole of nature and human nature (character) as such,
in relation to intelligible and empirical character. AU
of nature, the totality of her phenomena, exhibits strict
~ in accordance with the principle of sufficient
reason while the will, which manifests itself in this same
nature, is not SUbject to any such conditioning and is
therefore.f.Ug. Only man, through aesthetic contemplation,
has the capacity to gain a knowledge of what is Assential,
in the whole, or in some part of nature; this is "the
apprehension of the Ideas, the pure mirror of the world"
um, iv. sec 55, p. 287-88). In this will-less
contemplation of the intelligible, as we have seen, man
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experiences a fleeting freedom. But each man's mirrortng,
beginning as it does with each one's peculiar person
(bodily organism including the intellect or brain), is
distinctly one's own, and one's own unique, and therefore
valuable, expression of the immediate act of the will as
this 'appears' in aesthetic contemplation. In artistic
portrayal of the hUman being, the artist therefore strives
to make manifest, not merely the species-being, as in the
case of animals or plants, but the idea peculiar to this
one individual, distinct from all others, even of his own
kind, since
the character of each individual man, in so far
as it is thoroughly individual and not entirely
included in that of the species, can be regarded
as a special Idea, corresponding to a particular
",ct of objectification of the will. om, iL sec.
28, 158)
The individual's intelligible character, Le., his
will as thing-in-itself, is absolutely free, since it is
completely indepeudent of the law of causality which is
merely a form of appearances. This freedom, however, is
transcendental; it never actually appears in the world.
While it can be.tb..Qyght, it must be thought of as the inner
being of man-in-himself. 24 Thus, all the individual's acts
24In "Conclusion and a nigher View" of his Essay on the Freedom
.QL.th~.....~. il..!' schopenhauer invokes Kant as he explains the relation
between necessity and freedom, between the phenomenon and the
thing-in-itsel f. "As for him [Kant) the complete empirical reality
of the world of experience co-exists with its transcendental
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are entirely his own doing, regardless with what necessity
these proceed from his empirical character when it
encounters the operative motives. As regards the relation
of~ between the intelligible character (\ immediate
act of will') and the empirical character (its phenomenon).
Schopenhauer is adamant.
The intelligible character of every man is to be
regarded as an act of will outside time, and
therefore indivisible and unalterable. The
phenomenon of this act of will, developed and
drawn out in time. space, and all the forms of
the principle of sufficient reason (the form of
the phenomenon] is the empirical character as it
exhibits itself for experience in the man's whole
manner of action and course of life. (HR, iv,
sec. 55, p. 289)
And again,
This particularly and individually constituted
nature of the will, by virtue of which its
reaction to the same motives in every man 1s
different, makes up that which one calls his
character and, what is more, because it is not
known a priori but only through experionce, the
empirical character. It is by its means that, to
start with, the way in which various motives
affect the given man is determined. (ni. p. 49)
Any notion that this character undergoes alteration or
mOdification is mere illusion ern. pp. 51ff). According to
Schopenhauer, the empirical character unfolds itself over
ideality, so the strict empirical necessity of action coexists with
its transcendental freedom....My exposition does not eliminate
freedom. It merely moves it out, namely out of the area of simple
actions, where it demonstrably cannot be found, up to a region
which lies higher, but is not so easily accessible to our
knowledge. In other words, freedom is transcendental (ll1 V, p. 97-
99)."
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the ....hole course of the individual's life, in his conduct
and activities. Kno....ledge (including self-knowledge) of an
individual (empirical character) makes possible, not merely
character judgments in relation to the individual's past
actions, but also both predictive and predicative
determinations in relation to future actions. While some
particular action (as means) might be ill-advised due to
lack of kno....ledge or a judgment erroneous due to ignorance
of relevant circumstances, "the character is unchangeable,
and the motives operate of necessity" (rH, p. 53). It is
on the truth or the unalterability of character that both
the possibility of conscience (profound sense of remorse)
and the efficacy of the whole penal system, (Which
addl:'esses itself to altering the means, not the ends)
rests.
It is in cognition alone that the sphere and
realm of improvement and ennobling is found •
... [Motives] must pass through cognition, which
is the medium of motives. The cognition is
capable of the most varied enlargement, of
constant correction, in innumerable gradations.
That is the goal of all education. The
development of reason through information and
insights of all kinds is morally important
because it provides access for motives to which
a man would otherwise remain inaccessible. "The
final cause (goal, motive) acts not according to
~=:encZ:.~;2~ (~~tp. a~~)rding to its cognized
2sQuoted by Schopenhauer from Apuleius, The Works of Apuleius
(London: 1853). The last several lines here are somewhat vague.
I take it that Schopenhauer means that While knOWledge of that
S3
While schopenhauer contends that it is impossible for
characters to change, he does allow I.::omething he calls
'acquired character'. That is, when one has learned
through experience what one will and can do, and has gained
an intimate knowledge of the nature and limitations of
one's actual character, one is enabled thereby to fulfil in
a deliberate and methodical manner, one's own pecUliar and
unchangeable 'role'. This learnt role, however, is really
"nothing but the most complete possible knowledge of our
own individuality" om, iv. sec. 55, p. 305), that is, the
'acquired character'. Thus, while the individual cannot
change what he is, he can learn to act and to conduct his
life in a manner consistent with his character and thus
achieve a measure of acceptance and contentment in being
W:lat he 1&.
From the standpoint of his empirical character, the
individual, like every other phenomenon in the world, is
wholly determined, neither responsible nor free, and he can
only accept himself for what he is. When the individual is
considered from the standpoint of inner will
intelligible character, however, one recognizes that the
empirical character proceeds, after all, from that which is
not subject to the determinate forms of the phenomenon, and
which is a motive for the will is a~ condition of action,
character remains the necessary condition.
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is thus both responsible and free. This higher knowledge
provides the clue to the Schopenhauerian solution or
ethical responaibility and in this knowledge is the source
of huaan morality.
2.3. Beyond Morality: ~lJc.tici••
According to Schopenhauer, there can be no iL.Rd.2ti
basis for ethics; "there is no other way for discovering
the foundation of ethics than the empirical, namely, to
investigate whether there are generally any actions to
which we must attribute genuine monl wgrth" (.wi, III 13,
p. 130). He maintains that the actions so designated are
those of 'voluntary justice, pure philanthropy, and real
magnanimity'. While in the normal course of events, lithe
chief and fundamental incentive in man as in the animal is
egoism" (mi, III 14, p. 131), Kant insists: on
'disinterestedness' (however inconsistentlY according to
Schopenhauerl, in moral conduct. It is Kant's stress on a
'self-subsistent' reason's disinterestedness, on moral
action for the mere sake of duty or respect for the law and
not originating in feelings of sympathy and compassion,
which Schopenhauer rejects as utterly utltenable.
Schopenhauer defines egoism in general as the craving
or passion for existence and absolute well-being that is
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shared by animals and human beings alike. Everything that
opposes a man's egoism excites his will to anger, even
destruction, directed against whatever stands between
himself and his own interests or desires. Considered in
the practical sense, the egoistic individual regards
himself alone as n.a.l, and his will alone as deserving of
serious considQration. As ""Q have seen in Schopenhauer's
epistemology, "everyone is given to himself~, but
the rest are given to him only~ through their
representation in his head; and the directness asserts its
right" UW, III 14. p. 132). From a wholly SUbjective
view, an individual's own self thus presents a colossal
aspect, but "in the objective view it shrinks to almost
nothing, to a thousand millionth part of the present human
race" (ID:i, III 14. p. 133). In any case, in egoism, one's
own self and interests remain separate and apart from
others and their interests. Only through compassion or
sympathy is it possible to identify ourselves with others
and with their sUffering.
Schopenhauer asserts that ""hile it is egoism which
ordinarily governs one's actions, there are, as a matter of
fact, certain actions determined by tvo other fundamental
motivations, namely, malice and compassion. Schopenhauer
claims that compassion is the only genuine moral motivation
and it provides "the real basis of all~ justice
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and~ loving-kindness" om. III 17, p. 148). That
egoism and moral worth are mutually exclusive is a basic
premise of Schopenhauer's 'proof' of the above claim (mi,
III 16, p. 141), since only throur-h compassion is it
possible to desire "another's weal" rather than "anothsr's
woe" (Le., non-malicious), and even to desire another's
weal as opposed to "one's own weal" (Le., non-egoistical).
The question remains as to how it is possible to feel
compassion and thus to be motivated to actions of genuine
moral worth. That is, how is it possible, given
Schopenhauer's account of the will, and its manifestations
in human behavior, for any individual to act in a non-
egoistical manner?
In his main work, Schopenhauer describes the will in
all its manifestations (all life) as always striving,
hence, always SUffering, since all striving springs from
want or deficiency and dissatisfaction. No satisfaction is
more than temporary; rather, mompntary satisfaction merely
leads to more striving, more suffering. In man, with his
greater capacity for knowledge, sUffQring is morCl evident
and pain more acute. In Schopenhauer's view, pain is the
positive state, satisfaction the negative. "To this is due,
first of all, the fact that only another's suffering, want,
danger, and helplessness awaken our sympathy directly and
as such" (.aM, sec. 16. p. 149). ThUS, optimism is not
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merely a thoughtless, even absurd view of the human
condition; it is "a really~ way of thinking, a bitter
mockery of the unspeakable sUfferings of mankind" nm i,
sec. 59, p. 326).
For schopenhauer, it is imperative that morality be
distinguished from legality. In consideration of the
State, its legal and political institutions, Schopenhauer
gives an essentially Hobbesian account, wherein the sale
purpose of thQ state is to protect individuals, whose chief
characteristic is egoism, from the suffering each might
inflict on the other. Thus, ordinary justice is a matter
of the positive enactments of the state, the laws and
decrees, together with the punishments and penalties (Which
Schopenhauer characterizes as det~rrents) necessarily
attached to these. This justice is directed, not at the
character Dr disposition of the man, but at the unjust or
injurious deed, whose commission it seeks to prevent. The
citizen of the state, in so far as he obeys the htwS of the
state Whose protection he enjoys, is a~ but not
necessarily a trUly good or even just man. The truly just
man identifies himself with others to the extent that, even
without state sanctions and laws, he refrains from causing
injury to others and seeks to render to these that which he
receives from them. Justice, however, remains for
schopenhauer a merely negative concept, concerned with
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'deeds' rather than character itself. The question of
morality is one of the \ inner significance' of a deed, that
is, it goes to the heart of what a man a, his character,
from which proceeds all his acts and from which these arise
as the outward manifestation of that character. Education,
laws, etc. may very well re-direct an individual's efforts
in relation to his desires, ends, or goals, but they cannot
change these since they proceed from the unalterable
character of the individual concerned.
Legality may be enforced through motives, but not
~; we can remodel~, but not
really what we Will to do, to which alone moral
worth attaches. We cannot change the goal which
the will aspires to, but only the path it follows
there. Instruction can alter the choice of
means, but not that of the ultimate general aims;
every will determines these for itself in
accordance with its original nature. (.aM, IiI 20.
p. 194)
True, disinterested, justice and genuine
philanthropy tt.us has its source in morality which in turn
has its root in love or genuine human compassion, which
schopenhauer characterizes as a fact of human nature. All
notions of right and wrong, just or unjust, whether civil
or moral, are relative to character and will, but morality
is~ based on the fiUing of compassion, on a
complete empathy between oneself and others.
In an appendix to his essay on morality, as well as in
the fourth book of his reain work, Schopenhauer finally
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provides a metaphysical account of the possibility of
compassion. He says that the character of a man which
manifests its!!lf in the virtues of justice and
philanthropy, whose source is compassion, "makes less of a
distinction than do the rest between hi_self and others"
<1m, sec. 22, p. 204), even to the extent of laying down
his own life that others might have life and well-being.
For the egoist, on the ot.her hand, this distinction is
s'"lfficiently great as to permit the carrying out of a wrong
or harmful act against another in the pursuit of one's own
goals. For the trUly malicious, this distinction is 80
great as to afford the individual actual delight in
another's sUffering even tc the extent cf inflicting such
suffering at some cost or disadvantage to oneself. But
where is the justification for these varied relations
between one's self and others, whi.~h is the basis of the
actions of a good (or bad) character?
EJlIpirically, .le notion of 'distinct selves' or egos
is a product of intuitive perception. Here, in accordance
with the foOlls of time, space and causality, all plurality.
and hence, all distinctions between one's own person and
another's, is strictly justified. The concepts of 'good'
and 'bad' ('evil') are described by schopenhauer as
essentially relative and denote 'the fitness and
suitability, or unfitness and unsuitability, "of any object
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to any definite effort of the 101111" om, 1 iv, sec. 65, p.
360) . Thus, what is good for one person may be bad for
another; there is no 'absolute good'. Nor can ':he will, in
any particular manifestation, or indeed in the totality of
its manifestation, the whole world as objectivity of the
will, have complete and permanent happiness
(satisfaction) . It is for this reason that the truly
wicked or cruel individual also suffers much himself from
the great and unremitting intensity or asserting his will
against that of others, since all willing nprings from
want, and therefore frem sUffering. Indeed, thIs
individual is already dimly aware that the suffering he
causes others he inflicts also upon himself, although this
knowledge of the inner nature and unity of the will merely
serves to corrupt his own further, whereby this last
becomes 'absolute'.
In the strength with which the wicked person
affirms life, and which is exhibited to him in
the suffering he perpetrates on others, he
estimates how far hn is from the surrender and
denial of that very will, from the only possible
deliverance from the world and its miseries. Ho.
sees to what extent he belongs to the world, and
how firmly he is bound to it. The kJlQim
SUffering of others has not been able to move
him; he is given up to life and to~
~ SUffering. It remains doubtful
whether thIs will ever break and overcome the
vehemence of his will. (HE, 1 iv, sec. 65, p.
367)
In ethics as in art, the 'veil of maya' is penetrated
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in various degrees. To be sure, the artist who reccgnize!ll
and represents that which is essential in an individual,
for the~ of his art, apprehends the idea of which
thto. individual is phenomenon. To this extent the artist
transcends the limitations of perception. But the moral
agent attains to a still higher knowledge of the inner
nature of others in relation to himself--"Tat tyam asi
(This thou art)" om, sec. 22, p. 2l.1).26 Such an
individual., in his manner and actions toward others, shows
that he makes less distinction between himsel f and others
than is ordinarily the case (in the egoist) and has to this
extent raised himself above the ordinary, the phenomenal,
even the merely artistic, and all division and separateness
is abolished. This moral insight leaves behind the merely
quantitative character distinctions of the egoist and
affirms rather the qualitative, essential identity of all
individuals with oneself and one's own inner nature. for
Schopenhauer, such penetration into, higher
consciousness of, the inner nature of everything and
everyone, is the basis of all morality. The conduct and
action on the part of a character with the moral
designation g.QQg thus goes far beyond prudence or ordinary
26Schopenhauer here refers to the Sanskrit expression of the
knowledge that, beyond mere phenomenal individuation, we are all
one and the same entity which Schopenhauer calls the wilL
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justice, but seeks to further and enhance the life and
well-being of others, even at personal cost or hardship to
oneself. To act compassionately in relation LO another is
at the same time to recogni2e, ·'1 share the suffering .in
h.i.m, in spite of the fact that his skin does not enclose my
nerves" (lUl, sec. 18, p. 166). According to schopenhauer,
reason cannot directly account for th.e actual occurrence in
which another's sUffering becomes a motive ~; this
occurrence remains mysterious. Its possibility is rather
to be sought in the fact of that alleged double-knowledgll
the individual has, first of himself as representation and
will, and thence of the world itself as representation and
will. This double knowledge forms the basis of
Schopenhauer's moral philosophy, and is inseparably bound
up with the whole of his epistemology and metaphysics in
general.
In addition to the egoistical, the malicious, and ";.he
ethical or moral, character types, schopenhauer introduces
the notion of the mystic and essentially ascetic archetype.
We have already seen in the first three how an individual,
depending on the partiCUlar character type and his deqree
of knowledge about the inner nature or the world, I.e., the
unitary, all-pervasive metaphysical will, may exhibit real
goodness of disposition, Il a goodness that shows itself as
pure, i.e., disinterested, affection towards others·' om••
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I tv. sec. 67, p. 375). The morally good character, no
longer wholly captivated by the principium indiyiduationis
of empirical relility, penetrates the 'veil of maya'.
This penetration alone, by abOlishing the
distinction between our own individuality and
that of others, makes possible and explains
perfect goodness of disposition, extending to the
most disinterested love, and the most generous
self-sacrifice for others. om, I iv, sec. 68, p.
378)
But the highest expression of this clarity of 'vision' is
found not in morality, but in asceticism which has as its
source this same knowledge of what lies behind the veil.
Here, the knowledge the virtuous man has of the inner
nature of the world "becomes the quieter of all and ey.uy
!dil.l.ing" (HE, I iv, sec. 68, p. 379).
The will now turns away from life; it shudders at
the pleasures in Which it recognizes the
affirmation of life. Man attains to the state of
voluntary renunciation, resignation, true
composure, and complete will-lessness. . .. His
will turns about; it no longer affirms its own
inner nature, mirrored in the phenomenon, but
denies .it. The phenomenon by which this becomes
manifest is the transition from virtue to
~. nm, I iv, sec. 68, pp. 379-380)
with regard to such a man, as described above,
Schopenhauer claims that it is not enough for him to love
others as himself and to do as much for these as for
himself. The sacrifice of his own pleasures for the
greater pleasure (less pain) of others is now a self-
renunciation he makes for its own sake alone. This
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voluntarily trodden path of self-renunciation, as far as
Schopenhauer is concerned, is the path to salvation. But
one is not to imagine that the individual makes a conscious
and deliberate choice, in the sense of 'absolute freedom'
to change his whole personality at will. This reversal is
rather experienced as something immediate, a kind of
~; it involves a 'transcendental change' in his
whole being, through which the knowledge of the inner
nature of 'the whole' becomes 'faith' inner
conviction. 27 The ascetic or 'saintly' character is raised
above the perceptual and practical limitations of human
nature and attains to a transcendental freedom. In ascetic
acts, in the mortification of one's own will, sometimes
even resulting in unsought-after death, is found the
phenomenal expression of "the denial of the will-to-liye,
whir.h appears after the complete knowledge of its own inner
being has become for it the quieter of all willing" OiB, I
iv, sec. 68, p. 383). Schopenhauer's views regarding the
act of suicide and the notion of illUllortality have
particular relevance to his distinction between the egoist
271n the fourth book of the first volume of his main work,
Schopenhauer, describing the nature of this conversion, quotes
Asmus, who speaks of the "catholic, transcendenti'll change."
Schopenhauer goes on to say that the conversion of which he speaks
is "that which in the Christian Church is very appropriate..1.y called
~ or reaeneration, and the knowledge from which it springs,
the effect of divine araeo" (HB I iv, sec. 70. p. 403).
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and the ascetic or self-abnegating character. Schopenhauer
rejects the deliberate act of suicide as redemptive. since
it is not a denial of the will-to-liye in the manner
described above, but rather, n denial of life's sufferings.
a wish to be done with own's own personal sorrows and
afflictions.
The suicide gives up by no means the will-to-
live. but merely life. since he destroys the
individual phenomenon. He wills life, wills the
unchecked existence and affirmation of the body;
but the colllbination of circumstances does not
allow of these, and the result for him is great
SUffering. The will-to-live finds itself so
hampered in this particUlar phenomenon. that it
cannot develop and display its efforts. (,W!. I
iv, sec. 69, p. 398)
According to Schopenhauer, an act of suicide is thus
clearly an affirmation of one's will, rather than its
denial. If the unsatisfactory conditions of his lit'e were
otherwise than what they are for him, the individual would
not choose to end his life.
The conviction of~ immortality (survival of
individual consciousness after death) is an illusion since
to.he continuance of phenomenal existence thloUgh endless
time is an absurd contradiction in terms. But for the
person who, in the face of all its attendant suffering,
nonetheless dreads death and thus continues to affirm life,
schopenhauer offe:t:s some consolation. For death generally
brings with it no more than the particular end of a merely
"
phenomenal existence 1 for that of which this existence is
the outer manifestation, the timeless and eternal will-to-
live, "life is certain to the will, and the present is
certain to life". For Schopenhauer, the egoist need have
no more fear of losing the present, the form of all life,
than of falling off the globe .
.. .Just as on the globe everywhere is above, so
the form of all life is the ~; and to
fear death because it robs us of the present is
no wiser that to fear that we can slip down froID
the round globe on the tip of which we are now
fortunately standing. The fOl1ll of the present is
essential to the objectification of the will. As
an extensionless point, it cuts time which
extends infinitely in both directions, and stands
firm and immovable, like an everlasting midday
without a cool evening, just as the actual
sun burns without intermission, while only
apparently does it sink into the bosom of the
night. If, therefore, a person fears death as
his annihilation, it is just as .tf he were to
think that the sun can lament in the evening and
say: "Woe is me! I am going down into eternal
night. It ••• Only by a false illusion does the
cool shade of arcus allure him as a haven of
rest. The earth rolls on from day into night;
the individual dies; but the sun itself burns
without intermission, an eternal noon. Life is
certain to the will-to-live. . •. om, 1 iv, p.
280-81)
Yet, when all willing, hence all 'affirmation of t;he will-
to-live', ~, there is its opposite, not-willing,
I.e., 'denial of the will-to-live', and with this last, the
consequent abolishment of the world as representation, the
'mirror' of the will. Thus Schopenhauer ends the first
volume of his main work. with these exceedingly apt, though
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somewhat cryptic, remarks.
We freely aCl::nowledge that what remains after the
complete abolition of the will is, for all who
are still full of the will, assuredly nothing.
But also con-,;ersely, to those in whom the will
has turned and denied itself, this very real
world of ours with all its suns and galaxies, i5-
-nothing. um, 1 iv, p. 412)
Many Schopenhauerian doctrines find expression in the
works of Thomas Hardy. As we consider beloW the 'Hardyan
World' and the nature of those who people it, we will be
considering what is sometimes characterized as an artistic
interpretation or portrayal of the world as Schopenhauer
viewed it. Hence it will be possible to examine Hardy's
employment of schopenhauer's philosophy of pessimism by
holding up the Hardyan World as a 'mirror' thereby seeing
if that which it reflects is genuinely Schopenhauerian.
"
3. IlARDYl HmtAN NATURB AND CIRCUMSTANCB
There are four works by Hardy which are most
significant in relation to a discussion of Schopenhauer's
philosophy, since it is precisely these which are
subsequent to Hardy's study of schopenhauerZ8:~
Casterbridgel Tess of the d'Urbervilles; Jude the Obscure;
and The oynasts. Helen Garwood, speaks of a "curious
sympathy of outlook upon life" (p. 10) between
Schopenhnuer's expressed thought and that which emerges
even in Hardy's earliest works. Hardy's outlook, generally
denoted by the term 'pessimism', that is, a sense of the
universal suffering and apparent purposelessness of
existence, would seem to find a philosophical, indeed a
metaphysical, foundation and justification in
schopenhauer's writings. The consequence of Schopenhauer's
epistemology in relation to man's quest for scientific
knowledge is a happy one wherein certainty may be assured.
5chopenhauer WOUld, however, maintain that the greater
scientific truth is to be found in his metaphysics of the
phenomenal world, his metaphysic of character and his ·.'lews
on ethics, which render the attitude of optimism, or even
2BKelly, "Hardy's Readinq," p. v. See also Walter F. Wright,
The shaping of The oynasts: A study in Thomas Hardy (Lincoln:
university of Nebraska Press, 1967), pp. 3~tf; Robert Gittings, The
~ (London: Heinemann, 1978), pp. 114, 192.
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mere complacency, with regard to life itself, in all its
manifestations, absurd if not downright wicked.
Schoptmhauer does offer an insight into the metaphysical
underpinnings of the phenomenal, thus in some sense going
beyond the pessimism concerning the world from which we
must nonetheless begin. Whether in Hardy';\ art the
individual is ever able to free himself from the
phenomenal, or instead remains attached always to this
while str":'ving to discover some redemption in it, will
surely offer some insight into the relation between
Schopenhauer's philosophy and Hardy's art.
For Schopenhauer, individual life is unspeakably mean,
miserable, and mercifUlly brief. But everything that
exists, in all its plurality and apparent separateness and
autonomy, is only the outward manifestation ot one and the
same eternal, and insatiable will, to which life is always
assured. That man exists at all is, as it were, an ill-
fated accident, since the will, as thing-in-itself, is
absolutely free and unencumbered by any notion of cud or
ultimate plan or purpose. But as he is, so must he be, and
it is this question, of what man is, where it is he finds
himself, how he best accommodates himself there, where or
to what he must look for explanation and justification of
the misery and sUffering within and all about him, that
Hardy explores in his art. Is there any possible reprieve
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or escape for man from the prison of his consciousness and
the treachery of his body, from the eternal grip of the
wlll-to-live that he is, or must there be only and ever .:1
hard-won and undignified sufferance - that is the unifying
theme of Hardy's four works to be discussed beloW.
3.1. Cbaracter and Fatality: The Kayor of casterbridge
In~,~ Hardy illustrates
certain Schopenhauerian ideas, particularly the notions of
the inexorability of character, human suffering, and
aesthetic or emotive detachment, while not in every way
remaining consistent with Schopenhauer's views regarding
these. In the opening chapter, where Michael Henchard'g
sale of his wife Susan occurs, Hardy places the human
desires, strife, and hostility exhibited at the Weydon Fair
within
perspective.
wider, and distinctly schopenhauerian,
In contrast with the harshness of the act just
ended within the tent was the sight of several
horses crossing their necks and rUbbing each
other lovingly as they waited in patience to be
harnessed for the homeward journey. Outside the
fair, in the valleys and woods, all was quiet.
The sun had recently set, and the west heaven was
hung with rosy cloud, which seemed permanent, yet
29Thomas Hardy,~, ed. Dale Kramer
(Oxford: Oxford university Press, 1987). In SUbsequent references
title is abbreviated ~.
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slowly changing. To watch it was like looking at
some grand feat of stagery from a darkened
aUditorium. :In presence of this scene after the
other there was a natural instinct to abjure man
as the blot on an otherwise kindly universe; till
it was remembered that all terrestrial oonditions
were intermittent, and that mankind might some
night be innooently sleeping when these quiet
objects were raging loud. (MQ, p. 15)
It is this particular insight into the inner nature of all
existence which, while not eliciting the reader's sympathy
for Michael Henchard, nonetheless asks that judgment on
him, on his behavior and conduct, be withheld until full
justification (explanation) is tendered. Henchard, in a
drunken rage and encouraged by others who share his
temperament, selIG his wife to the highest bidder. "I'd
ohallenge England to beat me in the fodder business;" he
boasts, "and if I were a free man again I'd be worth a
thousand pound before I'd done o't. will anybody buy her?"
(MS;;, p. 10-11) That Susan departs with the sailor who
bought her, taking with her their child Elizabeth-Jane, is
regrettable, but Henchard quickly recovers from the loss
and proceeds, apparently unencumbered now, to satisfy his
lust for social position and prosperity. Though hoping, on
the one hand, that nobody could ever connect his name with
the shameful deed, he loudly proclaims his personal
identity in a churCh as he swears an oath to abstain from
liquor for twenty-one years, as many as he has already
lived. Thus he plans to put his past behind him and start
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his life anew. However, aco::ording to schopenhauer, a man
QQu what he II and his past, as \-:lIl as his future, are
inextricably bound up with his present, which alone is
real. His life's conduct and the whole of his experience
are merely the outward manifestation, phenomenon, of his
unchangeable disposition and character. While perceptions
vary and the means to desired ends change or are modified
through knowledge and discovery, those motives which
determine a man to action remain invariable throughout his
life. The real tragedy of human existence, as compared to
nature generally, is that only man attains to a
consciousness of the "vanity of all effort." Quoting
Schopenhauer, Hardy writes in one of his notebooks: nOnly
when intellect rises to the point where the vanity of all
effort is manifest, and the will proceeds to an act of
self-annulment, is the drama tragic in the true sense" (MQ,
Intro. p. xxix). It is, then, Schopenhauer's doctrines of
the world as will and his metaphysics of character, which
inform the tragedy of Henchard, the Mayor of casterbridge.
Of the four archetypes described by Schopenhauer,
Hardy offers in Henchard an artistic representation of a
truly egoistical, even malicious, character. By the end of
the novel, it is evident both to Henchard and to the
reader, that the rise and fall of the mayor is not causally
related to the various events that occur in the novel.
7J
Rather the action of the novel, its plot, is merely the
phenomenal expression of the fixed and unalterable
character of Henchard as this last unfolds itself through
time. From his first despicable willingness to sacrifice
others for his own ends, to hi!,; scheming against Farfrae,
his impulsion to lie, to cheat in business as in life
generally, and finally even to 'steal' the child of another
man that he himself might have all that he desires, are
only reflections that mirror what Henchttrd truly u: a
robust, defiant, wilful, egoist, the tragic victim of his
own ch~'I':acter, of his own will which is essentially, and
ironically, one with all that he would defy, even destroy.
In the face of the losses, first of his wife, whose
return to him is quickly followed by her death, then of his
mistress, Lucetta, whose death his own unremitting scheming
inadvertently brings about, and finally, the alienation of
his ona-time friend and manager and now rival, Farfrae,
Henchard remains defiant and unrepenting. But with the
loss of his business and mayorship to his rival, the losa
of his reputation, his social identity, his 'name' which he
fought 80 zealously to protect and enhance, he is finally
shaken to acknowledge the utter barrenne£s of his life.
His past does live on in the present as symbolized by the
funity woman from the long-ago fair who stands to accuse
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the Mayor at the heinous event she witnessed and
participated i~ there. Henchard, humiliated and ashamed,
resolves to take his own life but when he peers into the
waters that would serve that end, he sees himself floating
there, an effigy of himself the townspeople have cast there
in mockery and disgust. still driven by self-love and
vaUlting ambition, he pulls back from death, momentarily
taken by the thought: "Who is such a reprobate as I! And
yet it seems that even I be in Somebody's hand!" (MQ, p.
299)
In the course of the novel, Henchard learns that the
young woman, Elizabeth-Jane, who came to him with his
returning wife, is not his own child by that name, but the
offspring of Susan and the sailor, Newson. susan left a
letter to be opened by Michael only on Elizabeth-3ane's
wedding day, explaining that their girl had died in
childhood and she had named a child fathered by Newson for
the onC::!. she had lost. Disregarding even the last wish of
his dead wife so long as it does not accord with his own
c1esires, Henchard reads the letter as soon as he discovers
it. Though Henchard rejects Elizabeth-Jane in his rage, he
soon changes his mind. And he would keep the knOWledge of
her origins from her so that, failing all else, he might
keep her lovingly beside him. The image of Newson haunts
him, threatens him and finally, like the furmity woman,
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Newson also emerges from the past, in search of his child.
Henchal.d is unrelenting in his egoism as he repeats once
more the essential characteristics of tht:: deed enacted at
the fair: he separates a child from its natural father.
But his contrivances recoil upon himself and Elizabeth-Jane
is re-united with Newsen. Bearing upon him the whole
weight of his entire life's experience and accepting full
responsibility for what he is, for all he has done.
Henchard withdraws from the family and the community to
wander aimless, alone, yet with his will remaining
essentially unbroken: "I--cain--go alone as I deserve--an
outcast and a vagabond. But my punishment is n2..t greater
than I can bear!" (MQ. p. 313) This is a powerful
representation of Schopenhauer's doctrine of the malicious
and the trUly wicked character (previously quoted) :
In the strength with which the wickod person
affirms life, and which is eXhibited to him in
the suffering he perpetrates on others, he
estimates how far he is from the surrender and
denial of that ve,;y will, from the only possible
deliverance from the world and its miseries. H~
sees to what extent he belongs to the world, i'.nd
how firmly he is bound to it. The 1w2i!D
suffering of others has not been able to move
him; he is given up to life and to~
experi enced sUffering. It remains doubtful
whether this will ever break and overcome the
vehemence of his will. (HE. I iv, sec. 65, p.
367)
Henchard's tragedy is reminiscent of an oedipus
without morals, conscience, truth, a daughter,
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finally, to guide his blind steps, a Lear whose real
tragedy lies not in the knowledge of what is without, but
of what is within. But this is not an illustration of the
Greek Fate, standing over against man and even the gods 1
this is a schopenhauerian fate that II ma.n, in a. world
where no gods abide. Han is the hnpless victim of his own
traits and the inner nature of the world, which is anything
but law-abiding. Helen Garwood quotes from Schopenhauer's
"The Art of Controversy" on this doctrine.
"Consider that chance, which with error, its
brother, and folly, its aunt, and malice, its
grandmother, rules in this world; which every
year and every day, by blows great and small,
embitters the life of every son of earth, and
yours too; consider, I say, that it is to this
wicked power you owe your prosperity and
independence; for it gave you what it refused to
many thousands, just to be able to give it to
individuals like you. Remembering all this, you
will not behave as though you had a right to the
possession of its gifts1 but you will perceive
what a capricious mistress it is that gives you
her favours; and therefore When she tllokes it into
her head to deprive you of some or all of them,
you will recognize that whllot chi!lnce gave, chance
has taken away." (ThoIDI'JS Hardy, p. 25)
It is important to recognize that in Henchard, Hardy
presents no possibility of change or transition from
egoistical to aesthetic, moral, or ascetic character.
These Schopenhaurian transformative possibilities only
appear in the presence of self-conscious knowledge
concerning the inner nature of oneself and of the world. -
a knowledge sometimes arrived at by the artistic,
contemplative character but also sometimes discovered as
the result of great and often undeserved suffering. For
Schopenhauer, such knowledge, in so far as it is liberating
or redemptive, leads necessarily to renunciation and self-
abnegation. Such knOWledge, and thus such redemption, is
denied Hardy's Henchard. Throughout Henchard's life there
are only oft-repeated schemes and patterns; his knowledge
of his own past, its sins and errors, never presents itself
to him as a liberating experience. The whole of his Ufe
remains for Henchard an immediately felt and experienced
phenomenon. His life never raises itself before him as an
Object of .Im21ting, rather than simply one of immediate
~I he never contemplates life aesthetically rather
than merely attempting a theoretical understanding of it.
He relies instead on instinct and even on traditional ways
of knowing, such as conjurors, superstition, omens, and
miracles.
A dawning insight into the "contrarious
inconsistencies" (~, p. 319) of existence works to make
Henchard wish to wash his hands of life, but he remains
bitter and unappeased to the end. He steadfastly refuses
to defend himself in the face of his step-daughter's
rejection of him as one unworthy of her love. Henchard
subjects himself to a mean and harsh existence, finally
dying for lack of food and sustenance, a sought-after death
7"
by slow degrees, as just punishment for his actions. His
final act is the writing of a will insisting that the
bearer of the attached signature and representative of the
will so inscribed be forgotten, ironically recalling the
Psalm](l sung at the Three Mariners on the occasion of his
return-bout with liquor: "And the next l\ge his hated name
shall utterly deface" (~, p 233). His will is a 5uicide-
note, more a final demand, an ultimate and irremediable
Willing, than a prayer. Elizabeth-Jane recognizes the
bitterness, and unalterability, of Henchard' s final act and
testament. It is his name, twice recorded there, that
looms large amidst his final utterances, and "she knew the
directions to be a piece of the same stuff that his whole
life was made of lt CM£, p. 334).
While Hardy's reader may respond, not with sympathy or
admiration but with fear, even with awe, to the immensity
of a character such as that displayed by Henchard, this
last is yet recognized, from a Schopenhauerian point of
view, as representative of a fundamental aspect of human
](lPsalm 109:10-15. There is an irony in Hardy's employment of
these verses here, since it is not the justice of a vengeful God
but the eternal justice of the will itself that destroys Henchard,
a victim of his awn characteristicR. Henchard has a dim awareness
cot this 'philosophical truth'. "By this hour the volcanic fires of
his nature had burnt down, and having drunk no great quantity as
yet, he was inclined to acquiesce. She [Elizabeth-Jane] took his
arm, and together they went on. Henchard walked blankly, like a
blind man, repeating to himself the last words of the singers" (p.
235).
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nature, only richly coloured and boldly highlighted by the
skillful strokes of Hardy's art. The indomitable,
insatiable ....ill, beyond all judgment of fair or good or
right, lies at the heart of each of us, of all things, and
renders itself perceptible to the intellect in the
plurality and multiplicity of temporal events. Henchard
is, from beginning to end, a figure of isolation, lacking
that higher, and alone liberating, knowledge of the nature
and unity of all existence. In Hardy's novel, there is a
sense that something in the sheer greatness of Henchard's
egoism, in the tenacity with which he holds on to life,
....ills that it be bent to serve only himself and his
interests, is yet something noble.
Elizabeth-Jane's own knowledge of life and of
character, gained throllgh experience and reflection on the
irrational, senseless, and capricious nature or existence
and its attendent SUffering, is by no means inferior to
that of Henchard's. Less robust and rapacious in her own
zeal for life, she quietly, but not too thankfully,
endures. It is Elizabeth-Jane's response to life's
vagaries which presents another possibility, the single ray
of hope in Hardy's novel. Having put the events of the
past aside even as these remain central to who and ....hat she
is, informing her present and shaping her future,
Elizabeth-Jane settles into married life and a secure
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social position. Hardy describes her new-found
circumstances and her responses to these in the following
...The finer movements of her nature found scope
in discovering to the narrow-lived ones around
her the secret (as she had once learnt it) of
making limited opportunities endurable; which she
deemed to consist in the cunning enlargement by
a species of microscopic treatment, of those
minute forms of satisfaction that offer
themselves to everybody not in positive pain ...
Her teaching had a reflex action upon hersel f,
... her position was indeed, to a marked degree,
one that in the common phrase afforded much to be
thankful for. That she was not demonst.ratively
thankful was no fault of hers. Her experience
had been of a kind to teach her, rightly or
wrongly, that the doubtful honour at a brief
transi t through a sorry world hardly called for
effusiveness, even when the path was 3uddenly
irradiated at some half-way point by daybeams
rich as hers. But her strong sense that neither
she nor any hUman being deserved less than was
given, did not blind her to the fact that there
were others receiving less who had deserved much
more. And in being forced to class herself among
the fortunate she did not cease to wonder at the
persistence of the unforeseen, when the one to
whom such unbroken tranquillity ':tad been accorded
in the adult stage was she whose youth had seemed
to teach that happiness was but the occasional
episode in a general drama of pain. (tlQ, p. 334)
It is Elizabeth-Jane's stoicism, her quiet though 'cunning'
knowledge and acceptance of the 'persistence of the
unforeseen' that suggests a way, if not of escape then at
least of something slightly better than sufferance. In
this character, the reader discerns a quiet resignation in
the face of some unknown, blind and uncaring fate which
remains outside the individual, thus presenting an aspect
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quite antithetical to Schopenhauer's philosophy. In the
passage quoted above, 'the individual is no more responsible
for present happiness than of past suffering: Elizabeth-
Jane therefore allows her past pain to recede, while ever
aware that her present joy, also, is as transient and
possibly as undeserved. There is here a possibility of
endurance that is not stupid or wicked optimism, and which
is neither malicious nor mocking. schopenhauer, in a
letter once written to his mother, expresses essentially
that insight which Hardy permits Elizabeth-Jane.
"Allowing our past despair to fall into oblivion
is such a strange trait of human n~ture. One
might not believe it to be possible i:l: one did
not see it with one's own eyes. Tieck e;(prassed
it splendidly in approximately these worus: we
stand and wail and ask the stars: who might have
been more unhappy than we, while behind our back
stands the scoffing future and laughs at the
transient pain of man" (qtd. in Htlbscher, ~
Philosophy of Schopenhauer, p. 39)
As we have seen in Hardy, it depends on the peculiar
character of the individual and such knowledge as one
possesses of the world or of oneself, a 'Henchard' or an
'Elizabeth-Jane', an egoistic or a gentler, less voracious
individual, how one will acquit oneself in the face of such
knowledge and of life generally.
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3.2. Buffering' Innooence and Bocial corruption:~
p'Yrhervilles
with the next novel to be discussed in relation to
Schopenhauer's philosophy, Tess of the d'U~,31
Hardy ironically, and interestingly enough, gives his book
the subtitle "A Pure Woman". The story of Tess's purity,
in the sense of her natural or pure self and of her
origini!lol innocence and virginity, her gradual and painful
'education' in the ways of men i!Iond the world, her final
purification, serves to illuminate a number of key
Schopenhauerian doctrines. This novel is arguably the best
and fUllest literary 'experiment' with regard to
schopenhauer's views on life and the human condition. Yet
within the context of this novel, the deeper consequences
of schopenhauer's teachings, denial-of-the-will as the only
real and permanent salvation from the constant turning and
turning about again of life doomed by its very nature to be
suffered, at best endured, are not borne out. Indeed, they
are rejected as, if not untenable, then at least premature
in Hardy's view, given the relative 'youth' of this ""arId
we inhabit.
Hardy never per.nits his characters to experience the
31Thomas Hardy, Tess of the p'Utbery] 11es, 2nd edition, ed.
Scott Elledge (New York: W.W. Norton' Company, 1979).
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final Schopenhauerian transition from .llIorality to
asceticism and self-abnegation. His heroes and heroinea
are never granted 'redemptive' consciousness, that Is, they
never present with a truly Schopenhauerian 881£-
consciousness. Rather, what is revealed in Hardy's art is
a profoundly pessimistic view of existence as it actually
presents itself intermingled with a hopeful proposition
which finds its support in an absolutely deterministic
philosophical position: life really Q.Yght to be better than
it is; it is only a matter of process and time for such
betterment to be realized. Thus with~, Hardy begins to
develop a vision essentially inconsistent with
Schopenhauerlan view of the world, adopting rather an
evolutionary and distinctly late nineteenth-century notion
concerning the perfectibility of life and specles. 3Z
In Tess, Hardy does present a vivid illustration of
the SUbjective idealism of schopenhauer's epistemology.
Upon her sensations the whole world depended to
Tess; through her existence all her fe110w-
creatur.~s existed, to her. The universe itself
only came into being for Tess on the particular
day in the particular year in which she was born.
(~, p. 130)
Her own experience demonstrates to Tess the faUlty nature
of human perception and the inevitable cost in misery and
lZBtuce Johnson, " 'The Perfection of species' and Hardy's
Tess" in Tbomas Hardy's Tess of the p'Prbervilles, ed. Harold Bloom
(New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1987), pp. 25-43.
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sUffering of errors committed by herself and all those
around her. The world is not at all what we imagine or
would wish it to be, and Hardy passionately demands an
elCplanation, in the case of the Durbeyfield family, for
example, why that should be the case. That there is an
all-pervasive, deterministic, irrationality underlying the
seeming law and order of the universe, is a distinctly
schopenhauerian view toward which Hardy leans with a great
deal of sympathy and artistry. Hardy enterti!l;ins the
possibility, (a certainty for schopenhauer), that there is
an evil and cruel caprice at the very heart of all
elCistence. Looking up into the starry heavens, Tess points
out to her brother the many "splendid and sound" worlds
that appear in the universe and the "blighted one" on which
they are born and must abide. Her brother replies with an
natural insight often found a.~ong Hardy's rustics, even the
very young: 11 'Tis very unlucky that we didn't pitch on a
sound one, when there were so many more of 'em!" (~, p.
25)
In the developing plot, the young, innocent, naturally
beautiful and sensuous Tess Durbeyfield, whose impoverished
family is descended from the ancient and knightly
d'Urbervilles, is sent to claim kinship with a family using
the ancient name with no blood-claim to it. Misled,
seduced, taken as mistress by Alec 5toke-d'urbervllle, and
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returning to her home once more, Tess bears the child of
that ill-fated union, Sorrow. Hardy's treatment of this
theme of ravished innocence and woman's 'fallen state' is
interesting and must have appeared quite shocking to a
large part of his contemporary audience. His narrator,
after all, does not simply ask the reader on Tess's behalf
for compassion and forgiveness on the grounds of a shared
humanity, her youthful ignorance, inherited
incautiousness combined with an exceedingly well-endowed,
unconsciously inviting, responsive body. All this might be
reasonable, acceptable and at the same time quite
Schopenhauerian and consistent with schopenhauer's ethics
of sympathy as we have seen in chapter two above. But the
narrator rejects even Tess's own feelings of guilt,
SUffering and remorse as unfounded and her sin non-existent
except in the realm of faulty perception and in the
jUdgment of society's conventionality which has lost sight
of its roots (~, p. 77).
Contrary to schopenhauerian philosophy, Hardy
consistently characterizes Tess as in complete harmony with
the purely physical, biological and evolutionary processes
of organic nature. 33 He repeatedlY presses home the point,
that it is her social environment which is antagonistic to,
33~,p.42.
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even destructive of, Tess. In~ (see above, 3.1),
Hardy focuses on the malicious character, circumstance
entering only in the farm of various contingencies and
fatalities. With~, he develops a more distinct
~ of character vs. circumstanc~. Specifically, the
natural virtue of Tess's will-to-live is constantly opposed
by prevalent social attitudes represented here as
corruptions of what 2.Y9ht to be, were social forms and
mores true to their natural origins. Thus ~ is mare
distinctly romantic (in the sense of Darwinian not
Wordsworthian "naturalism") : the natural innocence of the
individual pitted against the decadenco of SOCip.ty.34
In ~, Hardy does not employ or :l.llustrate
sr:-hopenhauer's doctrine of the metaphysical will as
manifest in all existence; rather he affirms, in order to
celebrate, a certain vitality and regenerative capacity in
nature generally, and in Tess in particular, a natural
will-to-live apparent in all her suffering innocence.
Hardy then pits this natural (and hence, for Hardy,
virtuous) vitality generally, against a cruel and
capricious fate which ever stands over and against the
34ill.!;L., pp. 41-43. Johnson says that it is Tess's evolutionary
oneness with life that is her great virtue. The Darwinian
"happiness" open to her is defeated by Angel's more distinctly
romantic, Wordsworth ian "naturalism" and by modern society unaware
of its evolutionary kinship with all existence .
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individual, and particularly, in the case of Tess, against
the evils of a stagnant.: and corrupt society. In the
.:I.nsistent affirmation of life and creative evolution which
Hardy presents, with its~ pessimism and ..1.nml.J&ll
optimism as to the conditions of life, Hardy appears quite
un-schopenhauerian.
In ~, Hardy explores the notions of human agency
and 'redemptive' possibilities so that some solution,
however tentative, might be discovered in answer to the
riddle of life: "Why it was that upon this beautiful
feminine tissue, sensitive as gossamer, and practically
blank as snow as yet, there should have been traced such a
coarse pattern as it was doomed to receive ... " ('r~, p.
6::) • And the first step toward the final outcome is to
ofier social (in Schopenhauerian terms, phenomenological)
rather than metaphysical explanations.
As Tess's o...n people down in those retreats are
never tired of saying among each other in their
fatalistic way: 'It was to be'. There lay the
pity of it. An immeasurable .~ chasm was to
divide our heroine's personi'lity thereafter from
that previous self of hers who stepped from her
mother's door to try her fortune at Trantridge ...
. (hu, p. 63, emphasis mine)
Tess survives her first lesson on what will be a long road
of worldly education and self-discovery through painfUl
experience rather than formal tutelage or abstract
reasoning. Hardy does not hesitate to Buggest, however,
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that a maternal word of caution or advise would not have
been amiss, and it might even have obviated much of the
pain that accompanies Tess's initiation (~, p. 70). For
a time, Tess is passive, her movements trance-like and
mechanical and she avoids the company of others but Ita
resolution which had surprised her had brought her into the
fields .•. for the first time during many months l1 (~, p.
77). Tess nlay have wished for death, as she so often does
when faced with the sorrows and ini~uities of life, but she
could not die, even if she would.
She might have seen that what had bowed her head
so profoundly--the thought of the world's concern
at her situation--was founded on an illusion.
She was not an existence, an experience a
passion, a structure of sensations, to anybody
but herself. To all mankind besides Tess was
only a passing thought. (~, p. 77)
NOW, it is most interesting that to this distinctly
Schopenhauerian view, Hardy's narrator adds this
psychological/scciological observation:
Moreover, alone in a desert island would she have
been wretched at what had happened to her? Not
greatly. If she could have been but just
created, to discover herself as a spouseless
mother, with no experience of life except as the
parent of a nameless child, would the position
have caused her to despair? No, she would have
taken it calmly, and found pleasures therain.
Most of the misery had been generated by her
conventional aspect and not by h~
sensations. (~, p. 77, emphasis mine)
But the experiment that is ~, a representation of
pure will-to-live, that is, the abstract n,.idered visible,
9.
is far from over. In contrast to Schopenhauer's philosophy
of life, Hardy emphasizes the circumstantial joys and
plelllsures of life rather than its inherent characteristics
of frustration, unhappiness and pain in the following
passage:
There are counterpoises and compensations in
lifel and the event which had made of her a
social warning had also for the moment made her
the most interesting personage in the village to
many. Their friendliness won her still farther
away from herself, their lively spirits were
contagious, and she became almost gay....The
baby's offence against~ in coming into the
world was forgotten by the girl-mother; her
soul's desire was to continue that offence bY
preserving the life of the- child. (~, p. 78,
emphasis mine.)
Tess's child does not survive and Tess is as fierce in her
defence of the child's immortal Gaul as she has been of his
living body. She does not wish the child punished for her
'Gin'. It is with much poetry and not a little irony, that
in the face of Tess's ritualistic baptism of the ini'ant,
necessitated by Mr. Durbeyfield's pride and arrogance, and
the burial of Sorrow outside church grounds, as required by
canon law, the sincere but personally-perplexed parson
finds himself twice assuring the distraught Tess, "It will
be the same" as if all had been properly official and in
accordance with usual practices. This harsh experience,
however, serves only to bring to Tess's character a depth
and complexity which is at the same time liberating.
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Determined to shake off the past, in Schopenhauerian terms,
to "annihilate" it, Tess moves on, finding work in a nearby
dairy. "The irresistible, universal, automatic tendency to
find pleasure somewhere, Which pervades all 1 ire, from the
meanest to the highest, had at length mastered Tess" (~,
p. 88).
Both Hardy and Schopenhauer share the notion of the
persistence of the will-to-live and the impossibility I in
the ordinary course of events, of the annihilation of the
past (though in Schopenhauer's case this is because of the
inexorability of character, while for Hardy it is more a
brute fact of evolutionary process). For schopenhauer,
insight into these philosophical truths may result in self-
abnegation and renunciation of all life, the individual's
only path to salvation from life and human suffering.
Schopenhauer considers neither individual life as such, nor
historical and evolutionary processes, as meaningful in the
sense of redemptive or trans formative. But in ~, while
Hardy is critical of the value of attempts at either
annihilation of the past, on the one hand, or forced and
artificial re-construction and restoration on the other
hand, he does embrace the notion of organic, processive
change and renewal, that is, he is unable to relinquish the
phenomenal and therefore strives to discover some
redemption in it. In the novel, he often shifts visual
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perspective from the telescopic, or bird's-eye view to the
ordinary surface view to the microscopic view seen t·roa
below. Here he demonstrates that all nature is eternally
changing. eternally the same. Viewed from a great
distance, the apparent immobility of the land hides the
complexity and imperceptible though constant motion and
vitality of its inner life. The surface landscape, with
its present form and varied inhabitants rendered visible,
is merely the most recent strata of a vast natural and
historical past, covering over, and itself shaped by, that
past which includes Roman and pre-historic societies no
less than fossilized remains of vegetable and animal life.
For Hardy. all living organisms and systems, human or
otheNise, carry in them the unconscious Dlemory of their
origins and the whole of their evolutionary history, past,
present anrl. future. By analogy, the complex of human
society, its people, conventions, laws and institutions,
has the capacity, through oral and written tradition, the
natural sciences, the arts and humanities, history,
archaeology, anthropology, etc., to 'remember', not merely
unconsciously, but consciously, its own evolutionary
history. In~, the loss of Tess's o....n family history is
endemic to her society's forgetfulness of it's own origins
with regard to its la....s, institutions, and conventional
practices reSUlting in the absence of an integrated and
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stabilizing social order. For example, Hardy chooses to
apprise his reader of the historical significance of the
OUrbeyfield spoon with its coat of arms, a significance
entirely forgotten by the family who owns it, though Tess
herself manifests traces of her fierce and knightly
ancestry. And the mythic significance of the club-day
festivities of young Tess and her companions, its relation
to agriculture, to renewal and rebirth, has long ceased to
be a consciously remembered element of the annually-
repeated exercise. Hardy is not suggesting in ~ a
simple return to origins. Rather he seeks to demonstrate
that the~ memory of origins, of eVolutionary and
historical processes, is as imperative to the health and
well-being of individuals and societies as the~
memory is to any reproductive system.
The vital principle reasserts itself in Tess once more
at the dairy, manifesting itself most clearly and vividly
in the love between Tess and Angel Clare. For
Schopenhauer, love between the sexes is largely, or rather
exclusively, a matter of sexual impulse: once the latter is
satiated, the former dies. Now Hardy puts this view to the
test. Alec's use and abuse of Tess would appear to confirm
the validity of this position. But between Tess and Angel
there is a good deal more than sexual impulse, though this
is certainly in evidence. In the first place, Angel's love
OJ
of Tess is essentially romantic, an idealization of her
actual manner and demeanour that is unable to incorporate
the fact of her earlier, unfortunate experience. Angel
shuns the traditional teachings of the Chu:cch, in matters
of faith and doctrine, just as he rejects attempts at
restoration, and he is looking about for a system of ethics
not founded on dogma. But faced with the physical fact of
Tess's 'impure' state, Angel falls back upon the old
internalized morality and rejects his young bride. He
cannot accept as mitigating the !A£.t. that she was only a
child herself at the time of her liaison with Alec; it does
not help that she was forced, by the man and by
circumstances; it does not even help that he himself is
guil ty of the same indiscretion for which his young bride
immediately and gladly forgives him.
In uttering the words of his rejection, "the woman I
have been loving is not you, ... but another woman in your
shape" (~I p. 192), Angel, with no ti:ue apprehension of
what he is saying, clearly echoes Tessls own extraordinary
insight into the vicissitudes of life, into Angel's
character and the nature of his love for her. Hardy's
narrator tells the reader with some sarcasm, "Nothing so
pure, so sweet, so virginal as Tess had seemed possible all
the long while that he had adored her, up to an hour ago;
but 'The little less, and what worlds away I Itl (~, p.
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197) _ Angel's ideal, romantic love is nonetheless as real
as Alec's physical lust, and with no less tragic
consequences for Tess. lIis romantic idealism restricts his
vision '!.o the surface of things and his perception is thus
faulty_ The narrator suggests, with regard to Angel
himself, that "some might risk the odd paradox that w,lth
more animalism he would have been the nobler man" (~, p.
205) _
Hardy's description of Tess's love for Angel, on the
other hand, suggests the possibility of still another kind
of love between the sexes. As naturally sensual and
physically responsive as Tess is to Angel. "There was
hardly a touch of earth in her love for Clare" (~. p.
162) _ Tess's love is on a quite other plane, neither
general and abstract nor simply tied to the immediate and
particular, her love is pure, honest, unconditional, and
absolute. Tess is characterized as an essentially
innocent, compassionate individual, capable of the albeit
limited and fleeting liberation that accompanies purely
aesthetic experience. As a Hardyan heroine, however, Tess
never embodies a schopenhauerian self-consciousness: she
never comes to know herself ~ will, U freedom. Instead,
she often shares with Angel a dependence on old and
traditional modes of knowledge which involve fear and
superstition about t'amily history and inherited traits,
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curses, omens, and the tyranny of immediate, often
mistaken, perception. Unable to appreciate the essentially
virginal quality of Tess, forever old and forever ne.... , her
capacity for joyous and insightful living and loving, Angel
leaves his home to travel to Brazil, thereby embarking upon
his o....n doomed-from-the-start quest for redemption in the
Hardyan world of phenomenality.
Tess takes up once more her own life's portion,
mentally and emotionally~, simply and automatically
going through the motions of living and working. The life
and the work become increasingly harsh and, in a passage
that recalls schopenhauer's reflections on life, Tess asks
herself:
Was there another such a wretched being as she in
the world? Thinking of her wasted life, she said
'All is vanity.' She repeated the words
mechanically, lliLfJ'le reflected that this was a
most inadequate thought for modern days. If all
were only vanity, who would mind it? • 0•• All was
alas, worse than vanity--injustice, puniShment,
exaction, death. (~, p. 231, emphasis mine)
That life is more than vanity, that it is also a
Schopenhauerian will-to-live with just those attributes
Tess lists above, is thus not denied by Hardy. But Hardy
insists that this picture is yet incomplete and does
nothing to mend the matter. It is precisely the lack of
justice in the world that Hardy and his Tess rail against.
Tess, showing herself in harmony with nature as SUCh, yet
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knows intimately and well having experienced it for
herself, that with the add~d and unnecessary cruelty of
man, of out-moded traditions, aud ethical codes and
institutions which bear little relation to the actual lives
of the individuals they must serve, natural fate and the
circumstances of one's own personal character and
historical identity become a burden impossible to bear.
What appears as a Schopenhauerian compassion, in fact
a Darwinian lI naturalism", is reflected in many of Tess's
responses to the world and its inhabitants. At the sarna
time, Hardy demonstrates the general absence of this
quality in Tess's society. In her wanderings, Tess comes
upon a flock of birds, raised for sport, many left still
living but in abject misery by a recent shooting-party.
Tess feels a natural affinity with. the birds that allows
her to relate directly to the suffering inflicted upon the
helpless creatures by those less compassionate, who yet
carry on,~ for tradition and sport, a hunt the real
significance of which is hidden and forgotten beneath
multiple layers of civilized life. Tess puts the birds out
of their misery Io'ith her olo'n hands.
'Poor darlings--to suppose myself the most
miserable being on earth in the sight 0' such
misery as yours I ' she exclaimed, her tears
running dOlo'n as she killed the birds tenderly.
'And not a twinge of bodily pain about me! I be
not mangled, and I be not bleeding, and I to.ave
two hands to feed and clothe me.' She was
.7
ashamed of herself for her gloom of the night,
based on nr;othing more tangible than a sense of
condemnation under an arbitrary law of society
which had no foundation in Nature. (Tess, p. 233,
emphasis mine)
We understand from the above, that society' 5 condemnation
of Tess is as careless and pitiless, as lacking in
compassion and real civility or morality, as forgetful of
the natural and historical processes, as society's purely
traditional continuance of a hunting practice which no
longer serves life in any practical way. It is just this
kind of forgetfUlness, this kind of unconscious repetition
in the absence of real need and human compassion as this
has evolved in the individual, a double 'sinning' of which
Tess is least guilty, that raises her, of all the
characters in the novel, to the status of heroine, AGS1
sustains her in that status in the fage of all her life's
experience to the very end.
In the midst of her and her family's want and
SUffering largely at the hands of a cruel and unjust
society, Tess falters in her faith in Angel's ultimate
return. Her letters to Angel, no less than her prayers,
remain unanswered. with the death of Tess's father,
according to the~ of life-leasehold limited to
several generations, and in the name of a l!!2Ull.:tY which
has lost sight of its basis in compassion, the Durbeyfield
family is unceremoniously cast out of their home and driven
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off the land. With Angel's return from Brazil, physically
sick but also deeply remorseful, only to find Tess once
more mistress of Alec, Tess is distraught with condemnation
of Alec, of society's conduct as well as her own. When
Alec taunts her and berates her husband, Tess fiercely
defends Angel. She strikes Alec down with a vengeance
:-eminiscent of the Schopenhauerian doctrine of eternal
justice, rendered visible through Hardy's art. Tess's act
is the fierce defence of Angel's life and indicative of the
love she bears him; it is about the self-preservation and
self-affirmation of the will-to-live in the face of a
corrupt, modern society.
In Schopenhauer's philosophy, the world, indeed all
life, is the outward expression of a mindless, ceaselessly
striving will. The picture of life that emerges in
Schopenhauer is that of endless SUffering and misery as all
life-forms prey upon each other in diabolical competition
for continuance and well-being. The fundamental aspect of
life, its constant round ot. willing/not ",illing, is egoism.
In additio,l to earthly justice, limited and imperfect in
its capacity to protect and defend individuals from one
another, Schopenhauer speaks of an eternal justice, assured
by the very fact that any obstructing of the will, any ill
or injury sustained, no matter by Which partiCUlar
phenomenon, is suf'f'ered always and everyWhere by the same
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will as thu inner nature of the world, as the thing-in-
it~':=lf. An individual who has been severely wronged by
another, or witnessed great wrong-doing, can strive to
become t/1e arm of this eternal justice by c;oll'll'l!.itting an act
of murder against the perpetrator. In the following
passage, Schopenhauer explains the inner significance of
this phenomenon of revenge, or more properly, punishment.
This punishment is carried out by the individual,
not by the state; nor is it in fulfilment of a
law; on the contrary, it always conc'::!rns a deed
which the state would not or could not punish,
and whose punishment it condemns. It seems to me
that the wrath which drives such a n:"ln so far
beyond the limits of all self-love, springs from
the deepest consciousness thdt he himself is the
whole will-to-live that appears in all creatures
through all periods of time, and that therefore
the most distant future, like the present,
belon']s to him in the same way, and cannot be a
matter of indifference to him. Affirming this
will, he nevertheless desires that in the drama
that presents its inner nature no such monstrous
outrage shall ever appear again; and he wishes to
frighten every future evildoer by the example of
a revenge against Which there is no wall of
defence, as the fear of death does not deter the
avenger. The will-to-live, though it still
affirms itself here, no longer depends on the
individual phenomenon, on the individual person,
but embracer the Idea of man. It desires to keep
the phenomenon of this Idea pure from SUch a
monstrous and revolting outrage. It is a rare,
significant, and even SUblime trait of character
by which the individual sacrifices himself, in
that he strives to make himself the arm of
eternal justice, whose true inner nature he still
fails to recognize. om, 1 iv, sec. 64, p. 359)
For Hardy, the man Tess brutally destroys is also the
representative of til corrupt society recoiled upon itself.
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Afterwards, Tess runs after her husband, confesses the
murder, and they spen~ several days together, evading the
law, loving when they are not remembering, mindful always
of the brevity of the time left, the enormity of the time
wasted.
With the hanging of Tess and the actual close of the
novel, " 'Justice' was done, and the President of the
Immortals ... had ended his sport with Tess" (~, p. 330),
but the artist has already immortalized her spirit and his
art on the altar at stonehenge. What is most interesting
about the pre-hanging, mythic interlude before the end of
the novel, &0 full of poetry and art, is that its setting
at Stonehenge clearly pre-dates the whole tradition of
western civilization and yet it is not prior to human
civilization and spirituality. In invoking this infinite
past and placing Tess so peacefully upon the stone altar
there, Hardy intimates that the actual end of the novel,
the later hanging of Tess, is more a requirement of the
artist, his forrll (realistic novel), than any actual
necessity. While Tess resigns herself to that inevitable
SUffering and death which she shart!s with all the world and
against which she is powerless, her miserable life and
horrible death appear as much necessitated by a blind,
uncaring force in the form of an imperfect mechanism of
societal and evolutionary processes.
101
It is
Schopenhaucrian 'renunciation' we w:l.tness at stonehenge,
but a living sacrifice, affirmative of life and the forces
that ordain and sustain it. It is a sacrifice, of prayer
and homage, to Art and Truth as Hardy understood these, and
to Hardy's optimistic faith in creative evolution (a fait''!.
he shared with tlany of his contemporaries) and in the
regenerative powers of individuals (and societies) involved
in t.hc evolutionary process. 3S
~ is a novel densely-packed with antithetit.:al
ideas, literary, biblical, and philosophic.!l allusions.
Hardy employs various literary styles and conventions
(realism, poetry, myth, illusion and dream, romance and
legend) and narrative silifts in perspective and vision.
His charac,:ers reflect Schopenhauer's peCUliar sUbjective
idealism and illustrate certain elements of the
philosopher's ethics combined with a naturalism and
romanticism of a kind not to be associated with
Schopenhauer. But the most significant aspect of~ in
35In 1888, the year in which Hardy begins to compose ~, he
replies to an enquiry by Rev. Dr. A. B. Grosart as to the
P('lssibillty of reconciling "some of the horrors of hUl~an and animal
1 i fe, particularly parasitic" and "the absolute goodness and 000-
limItation of God." Hardy responds in the following manner: "Mr.
Hardy regrets that he is unable to suggest any hypothesis which
would reconcile the existence of such evils as Dr. Grosart
describes with the idea of omnipotent goodness. Perhaps Dr.
Grosart might be helped to a provisional view of the universe by
tho recently published Life of Darwin, and the works ot Herbert
Spencer and other agnostics" (~, appendiX, p. 358).
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relation to Schopenhausr's philosophy is the complete
absence of a truly Schopenhauerian self-consciousness, with
ita double-knowledge of the world as repr<\sentation and as
will, with its unique redemptive possibilities and that
transcendental freedom which it a.
Instead, Hardy portrays the indvidual as a natural,
but also historical and social organism, part of a larger
and living evolutionary system (society) with processive
and developmental attribute3 analogous to those of the
individual. In~, Hardy pits natural virtue ("pure
woman") against corrupted social values (of nobility,
morality, etc.). That this presupposes faith in the
"essential goodness" of the will-to-live, its capacity for
harmony and hence happiness, provides a clear criterion in
deterlllining just how far Hardy'S~ already departs from
Schopenhauer's philosophy of pessimism. In ~,
considered from the point of view of Schopenhauer's
philosophy I there is a purely circumstantial pessimism
combined with a characteristic optimism not to be found in
Schopenhauer. It is this difference of vision and
perspective, essentially rejecting the metaphysical and
remaining in the phenomenal, the physical and empirical,
that informs and det':!rrnines the structure and content of
~, and even more so of the next two of Hardy's works to
be discussed.
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... ftAR')Y: REDEMPTION AND IHKANENnSK
Neither Henchard nor Tess, the protagonists c#> Hardy's
novels discussed above are granted either the relative
(elective) freedom or the transcendental freedolll so central
to Schopenhauer's philosophy. In the Hardyan world,
absolute deterJllinism reigns and there is no escape for the
suffering individual as such. The antagonist in~
is Henchard's own character and personality, fixed and
unalterable for all time. So far so good. But short of a
clear and unobscured penetration of the schopenhauerian
'veil of maya' and the self-renunciation and realization of
transcendental freedom which can accompany such insight and
clarity of vision, posslbilities Hardy never affords his
heroes and heroines, there is no real hope or salvation for
Henchard. In~, Hardy does not assign the role of
antagonist to the inexorability of character and the
deterJllinism (absolute in Hardy, modified or nlA.t.m in
schopenhauer) that governs phenomenal existence, as in Ihg
~. The role of antagonist is inst.ead assigned, as we
have seen above, to society, or tt::! the human environment,
whose 'characteristics' are only apparently, and indeed
artificially and mistakenly, maintained as immutable.
ThUS, While the individual as such cannot change and is
wholly deterJllilled by its character, the species as a whole
can and ought to change and evolve, together with the
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environment (the social or cultural realm) in which it
dwells. In~, the~ will-to-live reasserts itself
again and again, refusing to be denied or repressed within
a mean and restrictive social order. This bias in Hardy's
art, toward the affirmation of the will-to-live as an
absolute aTld prime cause operating within an otherwise
thoroughly determined universe, represents a marked
departure from Schopenhauer's philosophy.
4.1.. Species vs. culture: Jude tbe Obscure
In Jude the Obscure,36 Hardy represents the conflict
within the self (the natural and the ideal) as the
internalization of the outer conflict between nature and
culture. Hardy depicts in this novel the urbane together
with the rustic, the larger all-encompassing society as one
huge "corporeal frame", surrounding the sUbjectively,
historically, geographically located individual.
Unlike Tess in the earlier novel, and indeed Arabella
here, JUde is consistently characterized as at odds both
within himself and also with the natural and social
environment. AS a young boy, for example, Jude is directed
to drive birds from the farm crops they would devour and he
360rhomas Hardy, Jude the ObSCUre (New York: Harper & Row,
1966) •
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is severely reprimanded for the misguided compassion that
leads hi.. to disobey the farmer and feed the hungry birds.
Nature's logic was too horrid tor him to care
for. That lIercy to....ards one set of creatures ....as
cruelty to....ards another sickened his sense of
haZlDony. As you got older, and tel t yourself to
be at the centre of your tille, and not at a point
in its circumference, as you had f.,lt ....hen you
....ere little, you ....ere seized ....itn a sort of
shuddering, he perceived. All around you there
seemed to be something glaring garish rott1 ing
and the noises and glares bit upon the little
cell called Your life and shook it ond WarD~
1t. (~, part I, ch. 11, p. 62-63, emphasis
mine) .
In the first part of the above passage, Hardy remaine
somewhat faithful to a Schopenhauerian view of the world if
one keeps in mind that underlying all phenomenal existence
Is the metaphysical ....ill, inherently il.l.o:ai&A.l. But in
those lines emphasized above, the artist introduces an idea
which is essentially empiricist and antithetical to the
idealism of Schopenhauer's philosophy. That nature, human
or othenl'ise is cruel and capricious is, according to
schopenhauer, a philosophical truth with a metaphysical
foundation. But that there is something apart from and
outside the individual, an absolute or uncaused cause which
enters into a causal relation with the individual, betrays
a latent empiricism and illegitimate extension of the
principle of causal! ty ....hich Schopenha\lor would summarily
reject.
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The temporal unfolding of Jude's character presents an
image of a naive natural life seeking vainly to accommodate
itself to cultivated society. We see JUde gaze upon the
town of Christminster from his distant perch atop the hills
of his own village, the town appearing to him as a beacon
of light and hope. He struggles to learn Greek and Latin,
imagining there to exist in the grammars of these ancient
tongues simple rules and prescriptions which would enable
him to transmute at will and with mathematical precision
the speech of his native tongue into that of a foreign one
(JUde, pa.L-t 1, Ch. iv, p. 72-73). He soon discovers that
the law of transmutation he saeks must lie elsawhere than
in the grammarians' books and he sets about on a quest for
the key that would open the door to health and happiness,
the 'good' life, beginning with a course of 'private stUdy'
in Greek literature and philosophy. But he is doomed to
failure in his quest to. discover the law by which lived
experience and living languages are to be faithfully
translated into the written words and civil and ethical
codes of society.
Jude finds no hannony between pre-Christian literature
and the culture of the mediaeval colleges at Christminster,
"that ecclesiastical romance in stone" (JUde, 1 iv, p. 77),
and he marvels at his own inconsistency in aiming for the
latter while submerged in the former. He recovers himself
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and looks to the means of realizing his goal of becominq a
scholar and ordained minister: "I can work hard. I have
staying po....er in abundance, thank God! and it is that which
tells.... Yes, christminster shall be my Alma Mater; and
I'll be her beloved son, in whom she shall be well pleased"
(~, 1 vi, p. 81). This tendency of human SUbjectivity
to vie.... itself as the center and sale support of the world
is ....ell described in Schopenhauer's philosophy. As 1n
Schopenhauer, harsh reality, that is, the world considered
from an objective point of vie.... as opposed to a merely
SUbjective one, soon impresses itself upon JUde, the
iRlpractical dreamer. Ho....ever, the metaphor of the 'key' to
transmutation at ....ill remains a central and unifyinq
metaphor throughout Jude's life as he attempts to discover,
or construct, a world sympathetic to and supportive of his
aims and desires.
Havinq identified himself with a spiritual ideal,
imagining himself as a Christ-like figure no less, and
seeing in the colleges and churches of christminster the
natural home of this ideal, JUde unfortunately meets
Arabella. Hardy's description of their fatefUl meeting.
when Jude's meditations are interrupted with a pig's
dismembered penis thrown at him by ria complete and
substantial female animal," Arabella, is full of humour and
irony, serving to determine by contrast the characters of
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both JUde and Arabella, only to then underscore a hidden
and underlying commonality.
It had been no vestal who chose .thAt missile for
opening her attack on him. He saw this with his
intellectual eye, just for a short fleeting
while, as by the light of a falling lamp one
might momentarily see an inscription on a wall
before being enshrouded in darkness. And then
this passing discriminative power was withdrawn,
and Jude was lost to all conditions of things in
the advent of a fresh end wild pleasure, that of
having found a new channel for emotional interest
hitherto unsuspected, though it had lain close
beside him. (~1 vi, p. 85)
The two become sexually intimate and Jude marries
Arabella, as convention demands, under th~ misapprehension
(deliberately fostered by Arabella) that she is pregnant by
him. The sexual impulse of the species is a primordial and
powerful natural urge in Hardy, as in schopenhauer. Till
now dormant in Jude, this urge is rudely but thoroughly
awakened by Arabella and Jude's intellectual hopes and
aspirations are quickly cast aside. In delineating the
intellectual, as well as the natural or instinctual
character of Jude, Hardy underlines the contradictions and
inconsistencies in Jude's stated or imagined aims and
desires and his actual behavior which is governed by the
more prior, insistent and, as yet unconscious, demands and
restrictions of his inherent character, innate abilities,
and natural proclivities. Jude imagines himself as an
intellectual, a scholar, naturally drawn to the scientific
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and philosophical environs of the university at
Christminster. But Jude finds himself physically outside
Christminster, excluded from the world it representi:! by the
accident of his birth, his social class, his lack of formal
education, and not least, his own contrary, inconsistent,
and essentially weak character. Here Hardy explores the
inherent conflict between the naive or natural, and the
ideal or cultivated self.
Once abandoned by Arabella, JUde goes to Christminster
and falls in love with his cousin, Sue Brideshead, drawn by
her apparent independence of and refusal to be in any way
limited to or governed by such matters as the natural
demands of species (sexuality and reproduction), the
circulDstances of her own birth and class, institutional law
and societal and ethical codes and conventions. The reader
learns, in the unfolding plot of~, that sue, also, is
a divided self. She is physically attracted to Jude,
despite all her insistence to the contrary, in spite of her
constant and strained efforts to repress her natural
feelings in favour of a purely intellectual and spiritual
relationship with him. Rejecting What she perceives to be
the superstitions and absurdities of church dogma and
metHeval philosophy alike, Sue is at once instinctively
drawn to the images of pagan deities and embarrassed and
remorseful a::>out her own responses to these images. She is
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aware of her own contrariness which leads her first to want
Jude then to repel his more amorous advances in favor of
marriage to the less attracti....e and undemanding Master
Phillotson, Jude's childhood friend and teacher. Jude
would accept a relationship with Sue on almost any terms,
if he could overcome the demands of his own body, but he
cannot. When the threat of Arabella looms large in Sue's
life, the jealousy aroused in Sue allows her to overcome
her disdain of physical union and dependency. Divorced
from Phillotson, Sue submits to Jude who happily accepts
her submission while seeing himself as the seducer of ideal
purity and desecrator of their ideal love. But the
essential disparity between 'ideal' hUman nature and
individual personality, as well as the antagonisms between
individuals and society, as we have seen in Schopenhauer's
philosophy, are not so easily overcome, much less remedied.
It is precisely Hardy's emphasis on these conflicts,
pressed to discover, with Jude, a key to reconciliation,
harmony, integration, while yet remaining always at the
level of species-being and culture, which differentiates
Hardy's philosophical standpoint (empiricism,
phenomenality) tram that ot Schopenhauer (idealism,
ill
metaphysics) .31
Sue steadfastly refuses to marry Jude, as dictated by
Church and Society, even though Sue and Jude are both
divorced from their former spouses. The conflicts that
characterize human love and sexuality are described in
abstract terms by schopenhauer. Hardy renders these
visible in the following exchange between Sue aJ'ld Jude.
'Apart from ourselves, and our unhappy
pecUliarities, it is foreign to a man's natu:t:"e to
go on loving a person when he is told thai: he
must and shall be that person's lover. There
would be a much likelier chance of his doing it
if he were told not to love.'
... 'Yes; but admitting this, or something like
it, to be true, you are not the only one in the
world to Goe it, dear little Suo. People go on
marrying because they can't resist natural
forces, although many of them may know perfectly
well that they are possibly buying a month's
pleasure with a life's dlscomfor.t ....But you,
Sue, are such a phantasmal, bodiless creature,
one who--if yOU'll allow me to say it--has so
little animal passion in you, that you can act
upon reason in the matter, when we poor
unfortunate wretches of grosser substance can't.'
(~ V i, p. 300)
What Jude fails to realhe here, of course, though he
ultimately achieves some insight into the matter, is that
31Ian Gregor, "An End and a Beginning: Jude the Obscure",
Thomas Hardy's Jude the Obscure, ed. Harold Bloom (New York:
Chelsea House, 1987). Gregor states the matter thus: "From one
point of v iew we feel ~ is the work of a man for whom the
universe makes-or ought to make-rational sense; it is something
"out there" to be interrogated, pondered over. And the
interroqator, though he may be skeptical in his enquiry, frustrated
and disappointed by his conclusions, is never in doubt about the
validity or the importance of his undertaking" (po 38).
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Sue is essentially self-centered, egoistical, ar.!:!
absolutist in her craving to be loved. Her avowed
independence of received traditions, and of sexuality, is
rather a defense mechanism and repression since she fails
to appreciate the positive value of either in relation to
her own needs. For Hardy, the fact that all such
contradictions are explained in schopenhauer's metaphysics
of the will, as of character, does nothing to remedy the
actual livod and painful existence depicted here.
A Schopenhauerian self-renunciation, the denial of
that will-to-live which is at the heart of all existence,
denial of the determination and insistence with which it
asserts and re-asserts itself, 1s seen by Hardy, if not as
a contradiction, then at the very least, as beyond the
governance and control of ordinary human SUbjectivity.
Nor, if it occurs at all, does it alleviate, on the part oi.
all life, the actual SUffering attendant its
continuance, and continue it does, if not on the part of
the individual, then certainly in so far as life 1n
general, species-being, is concerned. In a Hardyan world,
individual freedom in the schopenhauerian sense, whether
the relative freedom of human understanding, the momentary
freedom that accompanies aesthetic experience,
transcendental freedom as embodied by the ascetic, is
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altogether non-existent. J8
for Hardy, every seeming accident, chance,
coincidence, is really necessitat~, wholly determined by
conditions and laws, by the inherent character of the
individual and the nature of the world in which he exists.
But that underlying the whole of the phenomenal world and
the necessity or its laws is the metaphysical will,
absolutely free, essentially aimless, indifferent, eternal,
and immutable, is an aspect of Schopenhauer's philosophy
that leads to an altogether too pessilllistic vie.... of
existence holding out but a single hope, ....hile making it
virtually impossible for the ordinary man to even conceive
of such a hope, Illuch less to realise it. In~, Hardy
attempts to re-deUne and characterize human existence in
Illore optimistic ways which pel"1llit possibilities of
salvation that Schopenhauer would have scorned, for
example, the translation of natural laws into civil codes,
harmonious integration of the opposinq realcs of nature and
culture.
Sue marries, then divorces, Haster Phillotson, she
JIlt might be argued that Tess, in the earlier novel,
experiences the schopenhauerian fleeting and momentary freedom from
the incessant demands of the will in her aesthetic experience of
nature. Indeed, Kelly argues just that. However, I suggest that
this schopenhauer!an doctrine has already undergone considerable
rev ..sion in Hardy's Itii. under the influence ot Darwinian theories
which Hardy in turn adapts to suit his a.-:tiBtic purposes.
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rejects, then accepts, an intimate relationship with Jude,
and t1possibly she would go on inflicting such pains again
and again, and grieving for the sufferer again and Again,
in all her colossal inconsh~tency" (~, III vii, p. 217).
JUde, on the other hand, marries Arabella., although she
twice deserts the impractical and tormentod Jude, first for
an exciting and unencumbered life in Australia, and finally
simplY for life itself and on any terms. The union of Sue
and Jude which occurs between these two leave-takings on
the part of Arabella is no simple matter, either for Jude
and Sue, or for their more conventional society. The
introduction into their union of several children of their
own, along with Little Jude, the issue of Jude's earlier
encounter with Arabella, serves only to exacerbate an
already impossible situation. Hardy draws on the vast
bodies of philosophy, art, literature, biblical writings,
myth, superstition and legend to characterize at once the
suitability, and unsuitability, of their unconventional and
unsanctloned union in the face of the suffering and
injustice which life, manifesting itself in the form of
natura, on the one hand, and society on the other, heaps
upon Jude and Sue.
Little Jude's role in the novel, at once a sensitive
young child and a choric character of uncommon vision and
lnsight, prerigures the artistic vision and accompanying
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form of Hardy's later work The DYnasts. 19 It is this
child, born of Jude's unfortunate marriage to Arabella, who
turns on his half-siblings and on himself, committing both
mUltiple murders and suicide. Little JUde, or Father Time
as he is usually called, shares and witnesses the suffering
of his family, reduced to wandering homeless and
impoverished, and he takes seriously the gloomy
observations 'Jf Sue, selfishly and carelessly uttered in
the presenc'3: of the sensitive child whose scribbled note of
explanation for his actions simply states, "Done because we
are too menny" (~ VI ii, p. 376). It is not
unreasonable to understand Jud~'s words of comfort to Sue
as at once a shifting of responsibility away from the
individual, whose actions are wholly necessitated in Hardy,
and also as reflecting Hardy's fundamental criticism of
Schopenhauer's renunciatory philosophy, of idealism in
general.
'It Wi>S in his nature to do it,' said JUde. 'The
doctor says there are such boys springing up
Ilmongst us--boys of a sort unknown in the last
generation--the outcome of new views of life.
They seem to see all its terrors before they are
old enough to have staying power to resist them.
He says it is the beginning of the coming
universal wish not to live. He'S a'l advanced
man, the doctor; but he can give no
consolation.... ' (~VI 11, p. 376)
39Thomas Hardy, The Dynasts' An Epic Drama (London: Macmillan,
1978) •
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And it is precisely consolation, relief, rem£!dies and
prescriptions which Hardy, and Jude, seek. Following this
catastrophic event, necessarily brought about by the
coincidence of particular individuals, with partiCUlar and
unalterable characters, in a particular place and tille, Sue
returns to Phillotson and a drunken Jude allows himself
what remains for him the questionable and fleeting
pleasures of Arabella's awaiting arms and the more
questionable and lasting bond of renowed marriage vows.
Jude locates the cause of his own SUffering and that of his
family in something~ themselves as such. He fails to
recognize that his impractical nature, his ideal ism Which
remains wholly SUbjective, and the attempts to repress
natural proclivities and to reject the support llnd
direction of cOlllJrlunity and its conventions, provide the
occasion for llil the misery. In their nomadic existence,
they suffer, says Jude:
Because of a cloud that has gathered over us;
though "we have wronged no Ilan, corrupted no lIlan,
defrauded no manl" Though perhaps we have "done
that which was right in our own eyes." (l1J.l.s1.e V
vi, p. 349)
Hardy also places thl'l cause of their harsh and gloomy f.lte
beyond the governance and control of the individUllls
involved. JUde and Sue, as partiCUlar individuals, mirror
within and between themselves, the conflict between nature
(species-being) and culture (social order).
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From a
This is evident in
Schopenhauerian point of view, there can be no redemption
here 1 yet, Hardy deliberately confines his enquiry to this
sphere of the phenomenal. Hardy is aware of the nature and
limitations of his own standpoint.
Sue's reply to Jude:
We said--do you remember? that we would make a
virtue of j.:Jy. I said it was Nature's intention,
Nature's law ~nd raison d'etre that we should be
joyfUl in what instincts she afforded us--
instincts which civilization had taken upon
itself to thwart. What dreadful things I saidl
And now Fate has given us this stab in the back
for being such fools as to take Nature at her
wordl (~VI ii, p. 378)
Neither Jude nor sue discover the key to harmony
between the ideal and the real, between inner and outer
self, between nature and culture. In her grief and desire
to appease the powers that be, nature, fate, modern
society, none of which she is able to successfully control,
oppose or manipulate to serve her own ends, Sue returns
once again to Phillotson and commits herself to the pendnce
and self-imposed limitations of a loveless and essentially
sterile marriage, for her a form of living death,
renouncing the natural inclinations of both body and
spirit. Jude accepts Sue's withdrawal, failing to
recognize in it a characteristic selfishness and
repressiveness. He once more falls victim to the natural
candour and cunning of the luscious and earthy Arabella
whose appeal, in proper Schopenhauerian terms, is to sexual
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impulse, the practicalities of progeny, physical health and
well-being present in all living organisms and to the
securing of one's own pecUliar place within the society,
and class, to which one is born. Jude rellains, however,
si_ply unable to bring into harmony his ideals and the
reality of his life, his intellectual dreams and the
demands of his body, his behavior and conduct and the rules
and restrictions of society. Repentant of what he
peo.rceives as his seduction of Sue, Jude unites himself once
more with Arabella. He adopts II degenerate way of life,
despising Arabella even while he needs her to survive, but
in the end even phe cannot sustain that partiCUlar
manifestation of life which rejects the limitationy lind
conditions under which life must be borne.
Reflecting on this final painful turn, in the turn and
turn about again pattern that has characterized their
existence, Jude gives the following account of the fate he
and Sue have shared and suggests a possible remedy to the
difficulties and trials which were theirs to bear.
Sue was once a woman whose intellect was to mine
like a star to a benzoline lamp: who sawall mY:
superstitions as cobwebs that sho could brush
away with a word. Then bitter affliction came to
us, and her intellect broke, and she veered round
to darkness ..••And now the ultimate horror has
come--her giving herself away like this to what
she loathes, in her enslavement to formsl--she,
so sensitive, sO shrinking, that the very wind
seemed to blow on her with a tOUch of deference .
•. . As for Sue and me when we were at our own
ll9
best, long ago--when our minds were clear, and
our love of truth fearless--the time was not ripe
for us! our ideas \liere fifty years too soon to be
any good to us. And so the resistance they DIet
with brought reaction in her, and recklessness
and ruin on me! (~VI x, p. 441)
Though Jude appreciates here that he has been symbolically
unmanned and spiritually ruined by Sue, who then herself
commits a symbolic suicide, he never acquires a true
insight into the nature of their mutual misery and failure,
he fails to discover the long-sought-after key to the
harm-amy of existence except that it is, perhaps, a matter
of time and circumstance.
Jude finally succuml;!s to a fatal condition,
deliberately courted by his now all-consuming desire to be
done with the misery that is his particular life. He dies
in righteous indignation, bitter and angry, Hith the curses
of Job on his lips and none but Arabella, already about the
business of life and finding a SUbstitute-husband, to
answer his cry. In Hardy's novel, it is ironically fitting
that in the absence of that redemption which is open to the
individual in Schopenhauer's renunciatory philosophy, and
the similar absence of the Incarnation and Resurrection as
Christianity's answer to Job, it is Arabella, "the complete
and substantial animal" who survives the multiple murders
and suicides in Hardy's novel.
In Jude the Obscure, Hardy represents imperfect,
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necossarily flawed, human nature, placing this within a no
less defective environment, human society. He concentrates
his artistic energies on rendering visible the conflicts
and contradictions within the individual as such, and
between the individual and society: the Schopenhauerian
doctrine of the metaphysical will is conspicuously absent
from view. 40 Hardy continues to illustrate much of
Schopenhauer's epistemology and to affirm his doctrine of
compassion-based ethics, though this ethics is without its
metaphysical foundation and rather relies on the notions of
'natural sympathy' and 'shared humanity'.
It becomes increasingly evident in ~. that the
artist does not share Schopenhauer's intellectual
pessimism, based on the latter's characterization of the
absolute freedom of the will, viewed transcendentally and
understood as the neceSSi!lry presupposition of morality.
Nor does Hardy accept what he perceives as the dark and
gloomy consequences of Schopenhauer's philosophy regarding
the determinism which rules Clver all merely empirical and
phenomenal existence. Hardy's pessimism stems rather from
the~ of life than the inherent~ of life,
and it is upon the former that he focuses his artistic
vision. Hardy's pessimism is in this sense deeper (since
'Orn a novel restricted by the demands of realism, it is
difficult to see how this could be othel.'"Wise.
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it denies freedom and redemptive-consciousness) and at the
same time incomplete; there is a residue of a need, a moral
~ that innocence~ be offended even while it
inevitably is. Jude's innocence, for example, is already
corrupted by his acquired desire to live up to an
intellectual and moral ideal, even as the more subtle
encroachment of conventional society bears down upon
innocent nature.
JUde's failure as a man is a failure of character, of
substance, of language, none of which is within his power
tc- govern or control. His peculiar character (peculiar not
in the sense of schopenhauerian self-consciousness but in
the Hardyan sense of an 'ideal natural individual') is
simply and disastrously aligned with a peculiar social
order, and it is a very poor fit indeed. This
unsuitability, however, is not, as Jude imagines, because
his needs and aspirations are out of sorts with his time,
but because he (and society as a whole) is without the
means to translate these into the practicalities of
survival, happiness and well-being. Jude dies, not because
he rejects or renounces life as SUCh, but because he fails
to resolve the conflicts of his own real and ideal nature,
the internalized conflict between species-being and cUlture
Wherein the individual appears impotent and insignificant,
able only to curse, llInd to rail, and finally, to die.
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Behind Hardy's explicit social criticism, of the
marriage laws, the universities, property rights, etc. lies
a belief that the conventional itv, the explicit~ or
rules governing the laws, institutions, social and ethical
codes yet reflect a deeper, and for the main characters in
11~, as yet uncomprehended, still untranslated, language
of life itself. Essentially a fatalist, deterministic and
pessimistic, Hardy continues to seck out some ultimate aim,
purpose, meaning and rational orr.!cr in the universe.
4.2. The IIIIDan8nt Will:~
The context in which one might profitably understand
Hardy's movement from the form of the novel and the
constraints of literary realism to that of epic-drama, and
the transition from the realistic representation of
individuals and societies to the imaginative play or fable
of The Dvnasts, peopled by puppets and governed by spirits
of an imaginary Overworld, is alluded to in Ernest
Brennecke's Thomas Hardy'S universe". In quoting from
William Archer's Real Conversations, Brennecke points to a
certain antipathy between the practical and meliorist views
and conclusions that emerge in Hardy's~ and the
41Erneot Brennecke, Jr. ,Thomas Hardy's Universe' A Study of a
Poet's Mind (Lendon: Adelphi Terrace, 1924).
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necessary consequences of the Schopenhauerian philosophy,
this last an unmistakable element of Hardy's artistic
output.
'The world often seems to me,' said Hardy to Mr.
Archer, 'like a half-expressed, an ill-expressed
idea. " .There may be a cQnsciQusne.n, infinitely
afar off, at the other end of phenQmena, always
striving tQ express itself, and always baffled
and blundering, just as the spirits seem to
be .... My pessimism, if pessimism it be, dQes not
involve that the wQrld is gQing tQ the dQgs, and
that Ahriman is winning all alQng the line. On
the cQntrary, my practical philosophy is
distinctly meliQrist. What are my books but one
plea against 'man's inhumanity to man,' to woman-
-and to the lower animals•...Whatever may be the
inherent gQod or evil of life it is certain that
men make it much worse than it need be When we
have got rid Qf a thousand remediable ills it
will be time enQugh tQ determine whether the ill
that is irremedlable Qutweighs the gOQd.'
(ThQmas Hardy's ~, p. 146, emphases
mine)
Schopenhauer would certainlY not have argued against the
notion of a more compassionate society, which is precisely
what Hardy calls for here. But the notIon that the
metaphysical will manifesting itself in all the forms and
gradations of life is half-conscious, half-thinking, or
that it is somehow a first cause in an infinite series of
causes, are ideas Schopenhauer would surely reject.
Hardy's shift in interest and focus, away from the
universal and metaphysical will considered from the point
Qf view of individual SUbjectivity as the eternal and
indivisible inner nature of all phenomena in schopenhauer's
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philosophy, toward forces and aechanisllls at work in the
phenomenal world, viewed from some privile<jed position
above, beyond, outsida, the spatio-te.poral realm itself,
serves to distinguish Ha.rdy's vision fro. that of
Schopenhauer's, clearly illuminating what is unique and
original in both. Hardy now has in hand a vision loss
concerned with realistic presentation of the conditions of
life than with an assurance that there is, after all, an
ultimate plan, purpose, design, as yet incomplete and
uncoroprehended.
In keeping with much of late-nineteenth century
thought, Hardy views the natural (physical/biological) and
the socia/historical factors of the individual's life and
of society, 'organic' process essentially
interrelated and adaptive to individual and collective
requirements. This notion or evolutionary change,
development and renewal is antithetical to schopenhauer's
views and rather reflects Darwinian influence.
schopenhauer would lIlost assuredly reject any latent
idealism in Darwinian evolutionary theories which assumes
a progress tovard rationll1ity, perfectibility, etc. Such
a message, representing a huge revision of his ~ClrU.er
views regarding the inscrutability of exlstenc£, while at
the same tbe holding some hope at least in the possibility
of the individual as such achieving some sort of balance
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and har1llony within hiaself and between hiaself and society,
necessitates lliao a complete revision of artistic fona.
The OVnasts, as William R. Rutland states so
eloquently in ThgNS Hardy, is surely to be cOl~nted one of
the great contributions to Western arts and letters.
The DYnaats is to-day the greatest imaginative
representation of the Napoleonic epoch in the
literature of Western Europe. As far as English
is concerned, it is likely to relllain without
successors, as it was without forerunners. No
major English poet before Hardy had cared to
dedicate himself to that theme; and after Hardy
none will either dare or desire to Giog again the
lay he sang once for all. (Thomas Hardy, p. 271)
But it is in the work's philosophical underpinnings that
present interests lie rather than in its artistic
merit, its literary and revisionist interpretation and
presentation of historical events, or in details of plot.
In The pynasts, there is indeed a metaphysical foundation
to be discerned, but it is far removed from a
schopenhauerian metaphysics and it is .ore prescriptive
than descriptive. There can be no doubt that the seed of
the Hardyan metaphysic of The oynasts is to be found in
schopenhauer's doctrine of the metaphysical will. But
Hardy has so revised that doctrine under the influence of
other philosophies and theories, as well as his own
evolving artistic vision, that the nature of the world and
the will as articulated and demonstrated by the German
metaphysician is barely discernible. That the inner nature
12.
of existence is without order, design, or meaning in the
sense of ultimate aim or purpose is intellectually
conceivable, but for Hardy such a view is impractical and
is not borne out in the scientific assumptions and
hypotheses of his day. In empiricism, in positivism,'2 and
in Darwinian theories of evolution, Hardy discerns the
possibility of harmony and happiness in the perfectibility
of species and mutual adaptation between individual
organisms and their environment. Applying a scientific
me .al to human beings (rational and social animals) and
their natural environment (society, history, culture,
etc.), the chorie spirits of~, describe, lament,
and finally diagnose and prescribe for the inherent problem
of human suffering in the world which appears as the
consequence of an incompleteness in the realization of a
universal Unconscious will in the conscious, finite
SUfferings and actions of individuals.
Uw• R. Rutland. Thomas HardY: A Study of his wrjtings and
their Backgrpund (New 'tork: Chelsea House, 1987) pp. 83ff. Rutland
discusses Hardy's reading of Auguste Cornte in the 1870's. Rutland
argues that Comte's philosophy of positivism and his "attempt to
devise an immanentist religion in wbich a transcendent God was
displaced by Humanity, conceived as a single entity and advancing
towards perfection" would not have been congenial to Hardy' 5
thought (p. 84). still, Rutland gives the follOWing extract from
Hardy's diary for 1880: "If Comte had introduced Christ among the
worthies in his calender, it would have made positivism tolerable
to thousands who, from position, family connection or early
education, now decry what in their heart of hearts they hold to
contain the germs ot a true system."
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Hardy's epic-drama presents the advance of Napoleon
and his armies through Europe with a good deal of
faithfulness to the historical personages and events, but
it represents the General, the later self-declared Emperor,
the soldiery and the inhabitants of Europe, as altogether
mere puppets that move and act out their little parts in
accordance with tho inter-....oven designs of the Immanent
will's activity. The spirit of the Earth asks, "What. of
the Immanent will and Its designs?" and the Spirit of the
'tears responds:
It works unconsciously, as heretofore,JEternal
artistries in Circumstance,/ Whose patterns,
wrought by rapt aesthetic rote,/ Seem in
themselves Its single listless aim,/ And not
their consequence. (~pt. 1, act i, sc. i)
Thus, underlying the seeming whims and fancies of Napoleon,
with their inevitabls consequences, the dictates of war,
and the inevitability of fate and human history, is the
great Unconscious, "unweetinq why or whence" its own
pulsations. As the chorus of the spirits observe and
reflect upon the passing images of human history, in all
its misery and savagery, blood and lust, heroism and
betrayal, lofty ideals and harsh realities, they note that
Napoleon's time is far removed, in spirit, as well as place
and time, from Christianity whose rites and rituals are yet
practiced and observed in Napoleon's Europe. The Church,
in its hypocritical embrace of Bonaparte, as Emperor rather
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than Liberator, shuns convention and right and sides with
revolution and might, merely honouring and upholding that
which might best serve its own material wealth and well-
being. But the spirit of the Years points out that it is
the Unconscious which is the Cause of things and Napoleon's
"acts do but outshape Its governing" (Part 1, I vi, p. 65),
as indeed do the deeds of all involved in the human drama
Hardy displays here.
Hardy's evolving vision of the universe in ~
~ is described in extracts from Hardy's personal
notebooks quoted by Rutland:
Consider a grand drama, based on the wars with
Napoleon, or some one campaign....Mode for a
historical Drama. Action mostly automatic; reflex
ltlOVement, etc. Not the result of what is called
~, though always ostensibly so, even to the
<lctors' own consciousness. . ..Write a history of
human automatism or impulsion--namely an account
of human action in spite of human knowledge,
showing how very far conduct lags behind the
knowledge that should really guide it. . .. The
human race to be shown as one great network or
tissue which quivers in every part wherl one. point
is shaken, like a spider's web if touched.
Abstract realisms of Spirits, Spectral Figures,
etc. (Thomas HardY, p. 276)
It is this conception which faithfully materializes in
Hardy's epic-drama. In the stage-direction of the
Forescene, Hardy establishes the Spirit Chorus in the
Overworld and describes the terrestr1211 world as the
anatomy of the Immanent WilL The spirits look down upon
Europe, "a prone and emaciated figure, •.. where the
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peoples, distressed by events which they did not cause, are
seen writhing, crawling, heaving, and vibrating in their
various cities and nationalities. In his stage direction,
Hardy says, "a new and penetrating light descends on the
spectacle, enduing men and things with a seeming
transparency, and eXhibiting as one organism the anatomy of
life and movement in all humanity and vitalized matter
included in the display" (Forescene, etllphasis mine). Not
even the spirits are able to fully comprehend and justify
the~ of the misery and upheavals, of individuals, of
peoples, of dynasties which they witness during the era of
the Napoleonic Wars. Hardy elaborates the tale of Europe,
particularly of England and France, during the era in
question, in a manner unparalleled in English lett~rs, but
it is the debate between the Spirits in the Forescene and
the later Afterscene which concerns us for the most part in
rcl;·tion to Schopenhauer's philosophy.
This debate, like the tale of war which is its
occasion, with its conclusions already drawn, begins in the
Forescene as the Spirit of the pities observes:
Amid this scene of bodies substantive !strange
waves I sight like winds grown Visible, Which
bear men's forms on their in"umerous coils,
/Twining and serpentining round and through,
!Also retracting threads like gossamers-- /Except
in being irresistible-- /Which complicate with
some, and balance all.
And the Spirit of the 'tears interjects:
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These are the Prime Volitions,--fibrUs, veins,
IWill-tissues, nerves, and pulses of the Cause,
IThat heave throughout the Earth' B compositure.
ITheir sum is like the lobule of a Brain
IEvolving always that it wots not of: /A Brain
whose whole connotes the Everywhere, lAnd whose
procedure may but be discerned IBy phantom ey~s
like ours: the while unguessed j Of thOSE! 1t
stirs, who (even as ye do) dream /Their motions
free, their orderings supreme: /Each life apart
from each, with power to mete /Its own day's
measures; balanced, self-complete; IThough they
subsist but atoms of the one jLabouring through
all, divisible from none....
And finally, the General Chorus of Intelligences concludes
the opening speeches:
We'll close up Time, as a bird its van, IWe'll
traverse Space, as spirits can, /Link pulses
severed by leagues and years, I Bring cradles
into touch with biers: Iso that the far-off
Consequence appears jPrompt at the heel of
foregone Cause. The ~, that willed ere
wareness was, /Whose Brain perchance is Space,
whose Thought its laws, IWhich we as threads and
streams discern, /We may muse on, never learn.
Now there are several key philosophical ideas presented in
the above exchange which illuminate the question of the
relation between Hardy's art and schopenhauer's philosophy.
According to Schopenhauer, one never can stand outside
history, as Hardy's spirits do, with all its apparent
movements, changes, upheavals, and somehow discern from
some superior and autonomous position, a meaningfUl and
purposive pattern in the whole. Schopenhauer rejects such
"historical philosophising", and he maintains from the
point of view of sUbjectivity, always rooted in the world,
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that 'purpose' is ever and only relative to phenomenal
contexts and therefore also illusory because such 'purpose'
belongs only to the~, world - while that which so
manifests itself, the will as such, is utterly free and in
no sense purposive. While individuals are relatively free
and, barring any obstacle, can only QQ. what they will in
accordance with what they are, for Schopenhauer there is
also transcendental freedom. That is, in so far as
individuals become conscious of the inner nature of the
empirical world and of their essential unity with the
metaphysical will, they are trUly free and can truly nil
what they will. No such freedom exists in the Hardyan
universe.
For schopenhauer, the phenomenal world is wholly
determined by and sUbject to the principle of sufficient
reason. one form in which this principle finds expression
is the law of motivation, itself a form of the principle of
causality. But those motives which determine the
individual to action are intimately~ to the
intelligible, fixed and unalterable character of the
individual as this unfolds itself through time and which is
rendered visible in the deeds and acts of thR individual
over time. Furthermore, the moral character with
sufficient insight into his own peCUliar nature and into
that of the world at large as essentially the manifestation
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of the metaphysical ....ill-to-live, and apprehending the
misery and futility of all willing, may take hold of that
transcendental freedom which he thus beholds, and which he
is essentially, and find salvation in a complete abnegation
of the will-to-live.
In The Dynasts, there is for man no relative freedom,
in the sense of a freedom qual itatlvely as well as
quantitatively greater than that of merely instinctual,
perceptive animals. Nor is there a transcendental freedom
as in Schopenhauer's philosophy. Man and animal alike are
crawling, writhing, automatons, responding by reflex within
the great web-like tapestry woven by the Unconscious and
Immanent Will. In the Hardyan world, as opposed to that of
Schopenhauer, man is not his own fate, character is not its
own destiny, individuals in their particularity are not one
with the metaphysical will only viewed from the outside.
In The pynasts, the individual is neither free nor
responsible and there is nothing to distlnyuish the moron
from the genius, the egoistic and malicious from the
compassionate and courageous, however Hardy might account
for the many acts of heroism and human compassion he
pennits and so powerfully displays amidst the cruelty and
stupidity of war.
In Hardy's epic drama, man, as all else in the
essentially man-centered universe, is the puppet rJf the
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will, his fate and destiny caused, predetermined once for
all, by the Prime Will. It is man's tp>:'rible misfortune to
be born at all, and it is a chance and frightful accident
befalling him that he should come to full awareness of this
misfortune. On the one hand, the spirit of the Years
informs the reader:
The cognizance yo mourn, life's doom to feel, IIf
I report it meetly, came unmeant, IEmerging with
blind gropes from impercipience I By listless
sequence--luckless tragic chance, I In your more
human tongue. (Pt. I, Act v, Sc. iv.)
But as schopenhauerian as this at first appears, Hardy is
anything but consistent in his presentation of the nature
of the Immanent Will. Throughout The pynasts, all is
rigidly predetermined:
Ere systemed suns were globed and lit IThe
slaughters of the race were writ, lAnd wasting
wars by land and sea / fixed, llke all else,
immutably. (Pt. I, Act ii, sc. v.)
o innocents, can ye forget JThat things to be
were shaped and set JEre mortals and this planet
met? (Pt. I, Act vi, Sc. iii)
Thus everything in the Hardyan universe is predetermined on
the one hand, and caused by the unconscious, tentative,
gropings of the will on the other hand. Rutland, in
pointing to the inconsistencies of the above passages,
seeing these as irreconcilable even given that the
schopenhauerian will is not SUbject to the forms of time,
space and causality, views Hardy's epic-drama
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essentially !lawed in terms of its own internal logic. 4J
Such determinislll as there is in Hardy's epic-dra.a may very
well presuppose causation, but it is surely irreconcilable
with the view ot an absolutely tree, all-powerful, all-
moving, yet unconscious, unknowing, will. causation
entails tem~orality. predetermination presupposes
intelligence and sUbjection to time. It events are pre-
fixed from all eternity, then the will cannot be free; U
all is indeed predetermined, then the w11l cannot be
completely lacking reason in its designs.
For Schopenhauer, all meaning, order, truth, and
rationale belong to the world which is wholly phenomenal
and subject to the laws of time, space, causality,
variously expressed by the P _J.nciple of sufficient reason.
Viewed 1Ietaphysically, the Schopenhauerian world is
anything but .an-centered. or law-abiding. Hardy readns,
however, always at the level of phenolDenality and
historicality. In Hardy, perception is irremedbbly
4l.I.t!..l.!L., (p. 349ft) Rutland expresses his dissatisfaction in
the following manner: "Hardy professed to be indifferent to
inconsistencies in the philosophy of the ~, on the ground
that he did not advance the work as a system of thought, but as a
poem. And yet in the fIfth paragraph of his Preface he not only
shows a desire for the intellectual acceptance of his work; he alno
goes out ot his way to tell believers in a personal Deity that they
are intellectually out of date. It would have been well for OM
who so summarily rated all believers in God out of the order of
thinkers, after the manner of the once RClverend Leslie Stephen, to
look: a little fIlore carefully into his own logic."
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illusory, reason, where it appears at all, often errs,
memory is obscured by distance and time-pansage; all is
chaos and travail. In the overworld of the Afterscene, the
artist, however, reiterates once more the notions of
evolutionary process and change already appearing though
not explicitly developed or demonstrated in the novels~
and~. Here in The Dvnasts the evolutionary process is
v isualized in relation to the Unconscious will and Prime
Cause on the one hand, and the conscious and deliberately
motivated acts and deeds of man on the other hand, in that
hybrid genre (epic-drama) Hardy deems most appropriate for
his material and his message. Here Hardy offers the only
hope of salvation from the tragi-comedy, the dumb show, of
the existence he depicts.
Hen gained cognition with the flux of time, lAnd
wherefore not the Force inforning them, IWhen
far-ranged aions past all fathoming ISball have
swung by, and stand as backward years?
This notion of the Unconscious will evolving into a
will inforned by consciousness, and reacting again~t the
plight of its own creations such that "it fashion all
things fair" in future, is admittedly put forward in
compassion by the spirit of the Pities. Yet it is
perfectly consistent with the evolution of Hardy's artistic
vision, his revision of Schopenhauer's doctrines under the
influence of Darwinian theories, and his own creation of a
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strange and novel art-toni to present the world and life,
not as we generally e:lCperience and think about thea, but as
they really 21l.9ht. to be. It is only in so far as one
appreciates Hardy's~ and ruthless employment of the
philosophical, scientific, reliqious, and historical,
uterials in the creation at a work that would reflect his
O\lfll peculiar and oriqinal vision of an ol"9anic reality,
that one discerns the underlying consistency of his art.
The evolutionary doctrine or mechanism, which overcomes the
apparent contradictions of the ,""ork, renders the logic of
the world ot The Dyn&sts self-consistent while
antithetical, diametrically opposed, to Schopenhauer's
metaphysics. It is clear that the lIIost ~pparent source of
such a doctrine is rather to be looked for in Darwinian
theories of evolution and laws at transmutation, in
empiricist philosophies and in the philosophy of
positivism." Hardy's message is one of hope and
salvation, but unlike schopenhauer's philosophy, that hope
and salvation lies, while not external to the world as
SUCh, nonetheless beyond the access, governance, and
control of any individual SUbjectivity which remains, like
a puppet, wholly in the grip of the heretofore Unconscious,
"Wright, p. 38. Here, Hardy is quoted expressing a greater
indebtedness in the development of his own thought to Darwin, Hume,
and Comte than to Schopenhauer.
137
yet to become Conscious, Prime wilL
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5. CONCLUSION
It is not difficult to appreciate that, if one studies
Hardy's writings either by too small a sampling of his
quite substantial~ or from too narrow a perspective
of the whole of his output, much of the overall development
of Hardy'S artistic vision could not emerge within the
limited parameters of one's stUdy. Hardy offers his reader
an originality of thought and artistic presentation not to
be found in a purely Schopenhauerian, Darwinian,
Positivist, etc., reading of his work. Nor does the whole
of Hardy's vision come to light in any single piece of his
literary writings.
In considering his art rather as a single organic
whole, that is, from Hardy's point of view, art-as-process,
the work undergoes a philosophical development and achieves
a certain coherence and unity of thought, not to mention
originality, whlch escapes the more restricted reading. 45
Of greater consequence to this present thesis, however, is
that this latter treatment of Hardy's writings in relation
to Schopenhauer's philosophy serves to illuminate
4SIt is interesting to recall, by way of contrast, that
Schopenhauer'S philosophical writings are in the philosopher's own
words, "the elaboration of a single thought" which undergoes no
fundamental change throughout the entire course of his
philosophical career.
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clearly the meaning and consequences of particular
Schopenhauerian doctrines, by setting these beside other,
and often antithetical, views and theories, since this is
precisely the nature of Hardy's own methodology.
The view of the ....orld Hardy develops and presents,
under the influence of many and varied schools of thought
and his own response to these, bears little relation in the
final analysis to a schopenhauerian view of the world,
either intellectually or aesthetically. In spite of the
often-cited similarity of terminology, the meaning and
significance of various tenm~ drawn from schopenhauer's
philosophy undergo radical revision under the pen of Thomas
Hardy. As Hardy's own vision evolves, the dignity and
integrity of character and individual subjectivity, so
central in Schopenhauer's philosophy, is increasingly
undermined and diminished in the Hardyan universe of
absolute necessity. There is present to Hardy's heroes and
heroines no mode of knowledge which is fundamentally
liberating for the individual. Rather, in falling back
upon traditional ways of knowing, faUlty perception,
useless gE:..'ltlralizations, tradition, myth, superstitir,n,
legend and curse, omen, fortune-telling, etc., the
individual character is relieved of responsibility and all
is 'fate'.
In Schopenhauer, there are two paths toward that
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knowledge and salvation which is redemptive of the human
being and of the world.'6 The one way is voluntarily
taken, the other is taken in response to great su':fering.
The direction of the journey is inward; that is, these
paths are open to, and accessible by, human subjectivity
alone. The higher knowledge which is the occasion of that
freedom and change which Schopenhauer characterizes as
'transcendental', and which brings with it the sole
possibility of salvation through denial of the will-to-
live, is not deliberative, reasoned, or abstract knowledge
which affords only a relative freedom within the phenomenal
world. Nor is it purely aesthetic, though it is in
aesthetic experience that Schopenhauer discovers the
necessary clue as to the nature, and possibility, of such
knowledge as is required here. 41 It is an existential
awareness of the wholly illusory nature of all knowledge
USchopenhauer, iiB, p. 397. "The difference, that we have
described as two paths, is whether that knowledge is called forth
by suffering which is merely and simply ~ and freely
appropriated by our seeing through the principium indiyiduationis,
or by sUffering immediately felt by ourselves."
'7In schopenhauer, (p. 270), Peter Gardiner says that
"Kierkegaard once remarked of schopenhauer that he 'made ethics
into genius'." Fair enough. But Hardy essentially denies genius
and turns ethics into spontaneous, automatic reflex. In 1hg
~, for example, Napoleon's fatalistic comments to the Queen
of Prussia: "Know you, my Fai:::" /That I ... --in this deserve your
pity.--/Some force within me, baffling mine intent, --Harries me
onward, whether I will or no. /My star, my star is What's to blame-
-not I. /It is unswervable (Pt. 1, act i, sc. vii)."
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belonging to the subjective/objective pole of human
consciousness. This insight that the world is wholly
phenomenal is a double-insight carrying with it the
knowledge that the world is something in addition to
representation. This second insight is that the world is
also will. Now schopenbauer goes to great lengths to
separate the spheres of thought (judgment and reason) and
intelleot (peroeption and understanding) from that of will,
that is, the realm of existence from that of being. All
necessi ty belongs to the outer. sphere of existence and
empirical knowledge, all freedom belongs to the inner
sphere of being and tho metapli~'9ical will. But the real,
existential SUbject straddles both spheres at once.
For the empirical character, like the whole man,
is a nere appearance as an object of experience,
and hence bound to the forms of all appearance--
time, space, and causality--and SUbject to their
laws. On the other hand, the condition "nd the
basis of this whole appearance--which as a thing-
in-its...lf is independent of these forms and
therefore not sUbj ect to time distinctions but is
persistent and unchangeable--is his intelligible
character, Le., his will as thing-in-itself. It
is to the will in this capacity that freedom, and
to be sure even absolute freedom, thllt is,
independence of the law of causality (as a mere
form of appearances), properly belongs. This
freedom, however, is transcendental, i.e., it
does not occur in appearance. . •• As can easily
be seen, this road leads to the view that we must
no longer seek the work of freedom in our
individual actions, " .but in the whole being and
essence (existentia et essentia) of the man
himself. This must' be thought of as his free
act, which only presents itself to the cognitive
faCUlty as linked to tiJlle, space, and causality
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in a mUltiplicity and variety of actions. (~,
V, p. 97-98)
tot is just these crucial doctrines of Schopenhauer, on
the relation between freedom and necessity, and on peculiar
modes of knowledge, which Hardy revises beyond any
possibility of his art being mistaken as illustrative of a
Schopenhauerian philosophy. In Hardy, the problem of human
suffering is essentially one of limited and finite
knowledge. Henehard suffers because he lacks self-
knowledge: Tess sUffers beci:!use soci",t.y in general remains
ignorant and forgetful of its natural origins and purposes.
In~ the problem is less a lack of knoldcdge on the part
of individual and/or society, although this is in fact true
of both, than it is a failure of the cO'lllpatibility of such
reason and knowledge as each does have, And the failure of
mutual adaptation necessary for the heZllth and well-being
of both. Finally in The Dvnasts, the finite, lbited
nature of~ human knowledge is set beside the total
lack of J~owledge OIl the part of the Unconscious, Immanent
Will, freely groping, weaving, writhing, with neither
knowledge nor care regarding the consequences entailed in
its own impulsive designs. Here, the individual is devoid
of all freedom and ultimately bears no responsibility for
his acts; the only meaning in life is its rep~titiveness­
as-pattern 'caused' by the compulsiva weaving of the
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Immanent Will and which constitutes man's • fate'. 48 Yet
for Hardy, man is superior to that which wholly determines
both his acts and their consequences, in his evolved
capacity for compassion and in his albeit finite and
limited kno....ledge of truth and consequence. For Hardy,
only in so far as the Unconscious become:: like man, both
conscious and compassionate, is the continuation of life a
blessing, and salvation from the present conditions under
which it must be borne a real possibility.
For Schopenhauer, of course, this is all absurd and
results from a confusion between the empirical and the
real. All forces, however elemental, whether conscious or
unconscious, are merely the outward manifestation of the
metaphysical will which kno....s no such distinctions, no
plurality, no mUltiplicity. The attributes of conscious
and unconscious are irrelevant with regard to the inner
reality of the world which cimply exists, which simply is
that which it i§.. Notions of predetermination, causation,
design, etc., which both explicitly and implicitly appear
as attributes of the Immanent Will in the Hardyan world,
are utterly foreign to Schopenhauer's conception of the
will as thing-tn-itself. Any attempt to describe the will
48Cl. J. Hillis Miller, "Tess of the p'Urbervilles: Repetition
as Immanent Design" in Tbomqs Hordy's Tess of the Q'Urbervilles
(New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 19B7). p. 61-87.
144
in such terms is surely to be jUdged, from the point of
view of Schopenhauer's philosophy of pessimism, as
anthropomorphic and endemic to man- and reason-centered
views of the universe lind thus entirely antithetical to
Schopenhauer's philosophy. It is precisely through
indiyidllal human consciousness, more specifically gU-
consciousness, that man achieves insight as to his true
condition, phenomenally in but essentially Il.Qt........2., the
world, at once everywhere and nowhere. In Schopenhauer's
philosophy, man's path to his own salvation remains an
intensely~ matter; the path is always there, both
with, and withj,n, man himself. In evolution, considered
from a Schopenhaurlan perspective, man can look for no
really~ change, either for the better or for the
Fundamentally, everything remains eternally and
immutably the same: "a ceaseless, inevitable, wretched
replay of forces and counterforces of the self-destructive
will to live. ,,49 In Hardy's more realistic and deeper yet
incomplete pessimism. on the other hand, man's salvation
lies in something always external to the individual as
such, and is something only to be hoped for, possibly never
to be realized, at some infinitely distant moment of
49Arthur Hubscher. The Philosophy of SchQpenhauer in its
Intellectual Context, trans. Joachim T. Saer and David E.
cartwright (Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1989), p. 318.
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coincidence in the historical and evolutionary future at
the human species and its natural environment,
While schopenhauer admired .uch in the philosophy at
Descartes and his successors down t ~ Kant, he saw in this
tradition, with the peculiar role til ,re assigned to a self-
subsisteut reason, a certain lack ot truly earnest
skepticism. Indeed, this characteristic remains in Kant's
own ethics, despite his repudiation of the rational and
theological dogmas of Scholasticism, No doubt,
Schopenhauer would have made a similar charge against the
nature and role of the Hardyan Unconscious made conscious.
Schopenhauer expresses his view regarding such fettered
thought in the following verse he borrows fron Goethe as
being very applicable to free and independent thinkers such
as Descartes, and I suggest also to Kant, at least in his
ethics, no less than to Hardy in his agnosticism:
saving thy gracious presence, he to me
A long-legged grasshopper appears to be,
That springing flies, and flyin~ springs,
And in the grass the salle old ditty sings.
um, Appx., p. 423)
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